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The purpose of this research was to analyze the Technical
Data Package as a second sourcing methodology to create
production competition. Two second sourcing models and two
major weapon system programs were presented for this analysis
Issues analyzed include technology transfer, Technical Data
Package validation, technical data rights, initial investment
costs, and maintenance considerations.
As a result of this analysis it is concluded that there
is no significant guidance for the application of the Techni-
cal Data Package second sourcing methodology, there are
circumstances that are particularly inappropriate for the
use of this methodology, and that the two programs that used
this methodology appeared to have met their acquisition goals
This study recommends that one second sourcing model be
employed under actual program conditions and that the
program manager perform a comprehensive data package valida-
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Since the advent of OMB Circular A-109 , the acquisition
of major weapon systems has been focused on the competition
of alternative designs and technology to meet the mission
needs of DOD. Emphasis has now shifted to the establishment
of production competition in order to reduce program costs,
improve the quality and reliability of major weapon systems,
and increase the industrial base. Several models have been
proposed to aid the program office in determining how to
develop production competition and which strategy is best
suited to obtain this type of competition.
Literature recognizes five methods to create this pro-
duction competition. These five methods, or second sourcing
methodologies or strategies, include Form, Fit, and Function;
Technical Data Packages; Leader-Follower; Directed Licensing;
and, Contractor Teams. This research effort will focus on
the Technical Data Package methdology. This method uses
design specifications to obtain an identical (or near identi-
cal) item from a second producer or source without any con-
tractor-to-contractor interface.
A. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this research effort is to analyze
Technical Data Packages as a second sourcing methodology and
to review several second sourcing models as they relate to
11
the use of the Technical Data Package second sourcing
methodology.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was: What are the primary
attributes of the Technical Data Package (TDP) Second Sourcing
Methodology and how might this method be successfully employed?
Secondary questions were:
1. What is the Technical Data Package concept?
2. What are the significant factors required for its use?
3. What have been the significant issues or problems
involved with using the second sourcing method?
4. How does Technical Data Package relate to other
second sourcing methodologies?
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology employed included the gathering
of information from the literature, and telephonic and personal
interview sources. The literature sources included references
held at the Naval Postgraduate School, the Defense Logistics
Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) , DIALOG, the Air Force
Business Research Management Center, the Lessons Learned
Programs from the Air Force and the Navy, and DOD directives
and instructions. Telephonic and personal interviews were
conducted with Navy and Air Force program offices, Systems
commands and Logistics commands. Also, a Navy industrial
funded activity was included in this research. Persons
knowledgeable in systems acquisition, program management,
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logistics support and technical data were interviewed. Finally,
a private research and consulting firm was contacted for program
history and acquisition strategies.
The information gathered above was used to describe and
analyze the Technical Data Package itself and the Technical
Data Package as a second sourcing methodology. Two second
sourcing models and two major weapon system programs served
as the basis for this description and analysis.
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY
This research effort will be limited to the analysis of
major weapon systems and their components. Aviation electronics
will receive particular emphasis.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
It is assumed the reader has a general knowledge of the
Major Weapon Systems Acquisition process, program management
operations, and general acquisition procedures, concepts,
and terminology.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II of this study will provide an overview of the
Major Weapon Systems Acquisition Process, production competi-
tion, and second sourcing methodologies. Chapter III will
specifically focus on the Technical Data Package methodology,
its relationship with other methodologies, and a review of
several models outlining its use. Chapter IV will focus on
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Technical Data Packages as used in selected weapon systems.
Chapter V will present an analysis of the key issues that must
be considered prior to the use of the TDP second sourcing




II. FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
A. THE MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS
The acquisition of a major weapon system can result from
a change in national defense policy, the identification of a
mission deficiency, opportunities to reduce Department of
Defense (DOD) life cycle costs or opportunities to meet
existing mission requirements with new technologies. [Ref.
l:p. 4]
This mission need is documented with a Justification for
Major System New Start (JMSNS) . The JMSNS is submitted into
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process. Program
approval will be given via the Program Decision Memorandum
(PDM) . The PDM officially sanctions the major weapon system
program, and, when funds become available, gives the authority
for the defense agency to initiate the next phase of the
acquisition process. In a major weapon system program, there
are four phases in the acquisition process. These are Concept
Exploration; Demonstration and Validation; Full Scale Develop-
ment; and Production and Deployment. The last three phases
are initiated at a milestone decision point.
The Concept Exploration phase is initiated by a mission
need determination as authorized by the Secretary of Defense
(SECDEF) in his PDM. The JMSNS provides the required documen-
tation to support the SECDEF ' s decision. In this phase,
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alternative concepts are solicited to meet or exceed the
mission need. Also, at this time, the Program Manager (PM)
establishes the program charter and the acquisition strategy.
The results of this phase are documented in a Systems Concept
Paper (SCP) by the defense agency and provided to the Defense
Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) . Milestone I is
the first major decision point in which concept (s) is (are)
selected to proceed into the next acquisition phase. The
decision will be based on the SCP and the DSARC ' s recommenda-
tion to the SECDEF. Milestone I is a validation of the require-
ment, based upon such factors as cost, schedule, affordability
,
readiness, and concept feasibility. The authority to proceed
into the next phase is provided by the Secretary of Defense
Decision Memorandum (SDDM) . [Ref. 2:part 3, p. 25]
The Demonstration and Validation phase is that phase which
involves the demonstration of the system concept, estimates
the system's suitability to meet the mission need, and help
establish a baseline estimate for life cycle costs. The PM
will document the results of the Demonstration and Validation
phase using the Decision Coordinating Paper/Integrated Program
Summary (DCP/ISP) . [Ref. 2:part 3, pp. 34-35]
At Milestone II, the DSARC will review the DCP/IPS which
outlines the defense agency's management overview of the
program and the acquisition planning for the program's life
cycle [Ref. l:p. 8]. Based upon this documentation, the DSARC
will make recommendations to the SECDEF as to the most
16
appropriate system to send into the next acquisition phase.
The SECDEF will give his authorization to proceed by issuing
a SDDM. Unless otherwise stated by the SECDEF, or if the
program doesn't meet thresholds set in Milestone II, this will
be the last decision the SECDEF will provide in regards
to this particular program. Further approval will normally
come from the Program Decision Authority (PDM)
.
The Full Scale Development (FSD) phase produces a fully
designed, tested, and documented prototype of the concept
approved in the Demonstration and Validation phase. The FSD
phase is divided into three subphases; Engineering, Prototype,
and Pilot-Production/Transition to Production [Ref. 2: part 1,
p. 15] . During this phase, there is an iterative process of
design-test-redesign to perfect a production model design
for the following acquisition phase. The results of this
phase will be documented in the milestone review documentation
and provided to the Program Decision Authority (PDA)
.
[Ref. 2:part 3, pp. 36-47]
At Milestone III, the PDA will authorize initiation of
the fourth and final acquisition phase with his service
decision memorandum. At times, it may be desirable to
approve a limited production run to help in the transition
between the prototype model and the production line. If this
is the case, the PDA will issue a decision at the Milestone
III A decision point. Once this transition is complete, the
17
approval for full rate production will be given at Milestone
III B.
The decision to introduce a second source should be con-
sidered prior to this phase and be based on considerations
such as the duration of the program and the procurement
quantity. [Ref. 2:part 4, pp. 33-34]
B. FEDERAL POLICY IN ACQUISITION
The policy for acquisition can be derived from two sources;
the Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109 and the
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.1. The policy
stated in A-109 is [Ref. 3:part 3, p. 4]:
1. The needs of the mission will be stated in terms of
the mission instead of the equipment. This will
promote competition in the creation, exploration,
and development of alternative systems and promote
innovativeness
.
2. Place emphasis on the early stages of the acquisi-
tion process allowing competitive exploration of
alternative system designs that will meet the mission
need.
3. Communicate with Congress early in the major weapon
system acquisition process by relating the program
to the developing agency's needs.
4. Obtain agency head approval at key decision points
in the acquisition process and establish clear lines
of authority, responsibility, and accountability for
the management of the major weapon system program.
5. Establish a single point for the integration and
unification of the system acquisition management
process and for the monitoring of policy implementation.
6. Follow guidelines provided in OMB Circular A-76 for
private industry utilization.
DODD 5000.1 expanded on these above policies stating
that major weapon systems acquisitions shall be carried out
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in an effective and efficient manner, that management
responsibility will be delegated to the lowest possible
level except for those decisions specifically retained by
the Secretary of Defense, and that programs designated as
other than major shall also comply with the following list
of acquisition principles and objectives [Ref. l:part 2]:
1. Price and design competition shall be obtained for
the program to the maximum extent practicable to
ensure that mission needs are met in a cost effec-
tive and responsive manner.
2. Readiness will be considered on the same level of
importance as cost, schedule, and technical param-
eters and operational sustainability will receive
the same management attention as operational
effectiveness
.
3. Achieve program stability through effective long
range planning, evolutionary alternatives instead
of state-of-the-art technologies to meet mission
requirements, realistic budgeting and cost estimates,
plan for economic rates of production, and develop
an effective and responsive acquisition strategy
plan.
4. Decentralization of program responsibility, accounta-
bility, and authority to the lowest management
level possible that still maintains a comprehensive
view over the entire program.
5. A cost-effective balance must be achieved between
system effectiveness, acquisition costs, and major
weapon system cost of ownership.
6. To achieve standardization and interoperability of
major weapon systems at the international level,
cooperation between the U.S. and its allies shall
be maintained to the maximum extent feasible.
7. The health of the industrial base and the relation-
ship between Government and industry, both long and
short term, shall be a prime consideration in the
acquisition process.
19
C. COMPETITION IN ACQUISITION
Prior to the discussion of competition and its relation-
ship to the major weapon system acquisition process, it is
essential for the reader to understand the input market
structure in which the Government must operate. With that
understanding, the reader can better appreciate why the
Government has gone to such lengths to inject its own "com-
petition" into the input market structure.
The input market structure consists of both a demand
side and a supply side. In the demand side, the market
structure can be broken down into four broad areas: perfect
competition, monopsonistic competition, oligopsony, and
monopsony. From the point of view of the buyer, a perfectly
competitive market is one in which a single buyer cannot
influence the market price of the input commodity. A monop-
sonistic competitive market again has relatively many buyers,
however, a single buyer does have some influence over the input
item being acquired. The oligopsonistic market narrows the
number of buyers even further allowing only a few buyers into
the input market structure. Finally, the spectrum is completed
with the concept of the monopsony. In this category, there is
only one buyer for the goods in the market, thus allowing
great influence over the input item price. [Ref. 4:pp. 298-299]
The supply side of the input market is also divided into
four categories which closely parallel the demand side's.
Perfect competition is described as having many sellers that
20
accept the price as determined by the market (in other words,
the sellers cannot affect the commodity market price as a
single entity)
.
The monopolistic competitive market will have
relatively many sellers, however, price control is affected
by product differentiation. The oligopolistic market is char-
acterized by having a few sellers, one or more of which may
influence the market price. This market is also identified
as having a mutual interdependence between these sellers. A
monopolistic market has only one seller demanding a price up
to legal or market constraints. [Ref. 4:pp. 298-299]
With this description as a backdrop, the term "competi-
tion" can be better appreciated. Webster defines competition
as "n, 4a: the effort of two or more parties to secure custom
of a third party by the offer of the most favorable terms"
[Ref. 5:p. 464]
.
As should be apparent at this point, the Government (demand
side) , as a monopsony, can have a significant impact on the
price offered by the sellers (which are usually in something
other than a perfectly competitive market) . This price
influence of the Government is strongest in the earlier phases
of the acquisition process when the sellers are vying for the
winning concept. The competition here, known as design compe-
tition, selects the best technical concept that remains with
cost and schedule thresholds. [Ref. 6:part 1, p. 8]
In this highly competitive environment, the sellers have
a tendency to provide cost estimates that could be overly
21
optimistic. The program office, in its role as advocate,
often accepts these cost estimates at face value. When techni-
cal difficulties arise, the Government most always renegotiates
with a sole source, thus losing its monopsonistic leverage.
[Ref. 6:part 1, p. 10]
In an effort to reduce the impact of this demand side
lack of leverage, the Government attempts to restructure the
supply side market by injecting an additional seller, thus
taking away the monopolistic advantage of the original
seller.
One might ask now if anything less than perfect competi-
tion is truly effective. Effective competition can be defined
as that competition in which the expected benefits of having
competition outweigh the expected costs of creating it [Ref.
7:p. 21]. Also, one must consider in what way the benefits
and costs are measured. Monetary and non-monetary considera-
tions must be taken into account. For example, obtaining a lower
unit cost is a monetary benefit of competition while the loss
of a critical contractor due to competitive pressures is a
non-monetary cost [Ref. 7:p. 21].
This thesis is concerned with the establishment of compe-
tition during the Full Scale Development or Production and
Development phases by altering the supply side market struc-
ture. This is where the concept of production competition
(second sourcing) is introduced. Production competition in-
volves maintaining two or more sellers or producers of a major
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weapon system in continuous competition [Ref. 6:part 1, p. 12].
The objectives here are to improve the industrial base, obtain
fair and reasonable prices, and encourage quality and inno-
vativeness [Ref. 6:part 1, p. 11]. Implicit in these goals
is the establishment of that supply side market structure that
allows at least two producers to affect the market price
(oligopoly) instead of one buyer possibly demanding an unreason-
able price (monopoly). For clarification, production competi-
tion is often used synonymously with price competition.
However, this is inappropriate since price is only one of the
three objectives of production competition.
1. Benefits of Production Competition
The benefits of production competition are significant
albeit unique to each program based on the program's charac-
teristics [Ref. 6:part 1, pp. 16-18]. Frequently cited is
the unit cost savings that can result. Empirical studies have
well documented this fact [Ref. 8:pp. 25-26].
Further benefits include the improved quality and
innovativeness of the systems. Also, better control over
cost growth may be provided due to contractors submitting
changes for cost reductions vice design changes that add to
cost.
Finally, an increase in the number of firms competing
(both prime contractors and subcontractors) is an enhance-
ment to the industrial base. This provides for increased
23
geographic coverage by the defense industry as well as
surge and mobilization potential. [Ref. 6:part 1, p. 16]
2 . Costs of Production Competition
Production competition may come with a price tag
attached. It is obvious that in keeping more than one produc-
tion line open, the Government will absorb additional non-
recurring costs over and above the level expected with one
producer (increased administrative costs, tooling and set-up
costs, and technology transfer costs to mention just a few)
[Ref. 6:part 1, pp. 18-19]. Several reasons that these costs
might not be recouped by the use of production competition
is the short duration of the program or the limited quantity
of items being procured. However, since many systems are
procured over a much longer time than originally planned,
these reasons have a tendency of not occurring [Ref. 9].
Another problem with the use of production competition
is the decrease in contractor capital investment which leads
to a weakening of the industrial base (a decrease in profita-
bility may lead to a decrease in capital equipment) [Ref. 6:
part 1, p. 18]. Also contributing to this deterioration of
the industrial base is that using more than one producer for
a system could lead to excess capacity and, therefore, reduced
capital investment. This excess capacity could, however, be
to the Government's advantage because contractors may take




D. BRIEF HISTORY OF SECOND SOURCING
The first second source established by the Government
was after World War I for aircraft carburetors. Stromberg-
Carlson, the virtual monopoly on aircraft carburetors at the
time, could not be persuaded to develop a floatless carburetor.
The Government contracted with Chandler-Groves which, after
doubling their engineering budget, developed the pressure
carburetor used in all high performance aircraft engines in
World War II. [Ref. ll:p. 4]
The Government also would establish a second source when
the current industrial base could not fulfill the Government's
requirements. A case in point is the B-47 aircraft used during
the Korean War. Boeing's production line had to be supplemented
with that of Douglas Aircraft Company and Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation. Boeing provided the latter two companies with
all of the requisite tooling, technical data, expertise, and
parts and components. [Ref. 11 :p. 4]
It was not until 1968 that second sourcing was defined
in the literature as:
. . . another method for obtaining competition [at] the
reprocurement level is 'second source'. . . . Usually
the underlying R&D is performed by a single firm. . . .
During the initial production or during follow-on pro-
duction, or both, there is some form of competition. . . .
The new second source sets up a production line.
Production by the original and second source may overlap
in time, two production lines may be maintained through
much of the program, or the original source may drop out
of the program, with the award of the contract to the
new supplier. [Ref. ll:p. 5]
In the 1970' s, it was recognized that second sourcing could
be effective in reducing risk in pricing and production
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(having an additional source capable of producing an item in
case the original source has technical problems in production)
[Ref. ll:p. 5]. Thus, second sourcing was initially used to
create innovation and increase the industrial mobilization
base during war time, and, more recently, used to establish
production competition and reduce risk [Ref. ll:p. 5].
E. SECOND SOURCING METHODOLOGIES
Currently, there are five second sourcing methodologies
generally recognized in the literature: form, fit, and
function; technical data packages; directed licensing;
leader- follower ; and contractor teams [Ref. 12:p. 13].
Form, fit, and function (F ) is a second sourcing method
by which there is no interaction between production sources
nor is there any type of data package that must be provided
from the developing source to the second source. The second
source is provided only in performance specifications such as
overall performance, size, weight, mounting requirements, and
interface requirements. This "black box" concept is used
mostly for those items which are considered consumable in
nature and where the Government is not concerned with the
inner workings of the item. This methodology is not con-
sidered feasible for maintenance levels other than the con-
tractor level. Increased life cycle costs are generally
cited as the reason for not being feasible (increased cost
of inventory for spares unique to the particular component,
26
test equipment, and personnel training costs) . Warranties,
renewable maintenance contracts, and/or contractor service
provision for the life of the component are several ways to
make this methodology appropriate for non-organic maintenance
philosophies. [Ref. 12 :p. 13]
3The advantages to F are [Ref. 12:pp. 13-14]:
Standardization may be achieved at the component level
due to the interchangeability of the components pro-
duced by the various sources.
An element of disengagement of Government involvement
with the contractor can be experienced.
The Government does not have to buy or maintain a data
package.
The contractor is responsible for the design of the
component.
3Disadvantages of the F methodology include [Ref. 12:
p. 14] :
Significant problems may arise if there is performance
or interface instability in the design of the system
being procured.
Interface and performance specifications must be explicitly
stated to ensure true interchangeability between
components
.
Unless there is competitive pressure to ensure reason-
able life cycle maintenance costs from the contractor,
reapir part costs could become excessive once the
contractor realizes he is in a sole source position
for items unique to his design.
For each procurement of the component, the lowest bidder
may be the contractor with the least overall apprecia-
tion for the required component.
There will be additional development costs (unless an
off-the-shelf model is used) for each procurement due
to new costs associated with research and development,
engineering, learning curve quantities, and changes.
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Technical data packages (TDP's) can be considered the
3
exact opposite of F in the sense that TDP's axe based on
design specifications as opposed to performance specifications.
These methods are similar in that the production sources re-
quire no interface. The TDP is normally developed by the
original source. The Government then obtains the TDP using
either a data rights clause or the purchase of the TDP out-
right. Problems with outright purchase may be the excessive
cost [Ref. 12 :p. 14]. Since independent research and develop-
ment funds were expended by the contractor, this usually means
the use of proprietary information in the TDP, therefore an
added expense to the Government. Another problem associated
with the use of the TDP is the potential ability of a second
source to interpret the technical data. This can be overcome
by properly validating the technical data package, use of a
patent/latent defects clause for technical data, and a pre-
production evaluation of the second source. [Ref. 12 :p. 14]
Advantages in using the TDP as a second sourcing methodology
include [Ref. 12 :p. 14]:
When the TDP is properly validated and proven in produc-
tion as adequate, it is relatively simple to second
source the system/component. In fact, the original
producer can be eliminated altogether from future
reprocurements
.
The TDP can be used in subsequent procurements to
maintain a competitive environment throughout the
production of the system/component.
Disadvantages to the TDP methodology are [Ref. 12:
p. 14] :
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Obtaining a properly validated TDP for use in reprocure-
ment may be difficult, costly, and time consuming.
While the original producer can legitimately use the
TDP, a second source may find it difficult to do so.
The Government must be able to maintain some kind of
internal expertise to solve technical problems that
may arise.
The system/component may be too complex technologically
to not have some form of interface between the original
producer and the second source.
The second source may be so significantly different
technologically from the original producer that use
of the TDP as intended may be extremely difficult,
if not impossible.
The directed licensing methodology provides for the
competition of a system developed by the original source
among other contractors. The winning contractor (licensee)
is provided the technical data and the necessary technical
assistance from the original producer (licensor). The
original contractor is compensated by royalty fees in this
arrangement. The directed licensing arrangement can be speci-
fied by a clause early in the major weapon system acquisition
process or negotiated at a later time. Usually, however, it
is better to negotiate this arrangement as early as possible,
preferably before the selection of the developing contractor
(while the Government can still exercise its monopsonistic
power) . This will help avoid unreasonable royalty fee require-
ments from the developing contractor. [Ref. 12 :p. 15]
Advantages to the directed licensing approach are [Ref.
12:p. 15]
:
The developing contractor is provided protection as to
how and in what markets the second source is allowed to
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sell the product. Also, the developing contractor is
compensated monetarily for each item sold under the
licensing arrangement.
Supply source and production quantity decisions can be
delayed until a later time in the acquisition process.
The Government can disengage somewhat from the acqui-
sition process since it is not required to be involved
with the interaction between production sources.
Potential production competition can be maintained
throughout the life of the program.
Disadvantages include [Ref. 12:p. 15]:
Design accountability may become difficult to maintain.
Unethical business practices may occur in that some
contractors may bid on a project just to gain access
to the developing contractor's proprietary data.
The proper degree of cooperation between the licensee
and the licensor may be difficult to achieve especially
if there is a lack of genuine support from the develop-
ing contractor.
The cost of royalty fees and technical assistance
fees limit the effects of competition or may negate the
effects altogether.
The leader-follower second sourcing methodology is
defined by the Federal Procurement Regulation (FAR) as:
. . . an extraordinary acquisition technique that is
limited to special circumstances and utilized only when
its use is in accordance with agency procedures. A
developer or sole producer of a product or system is desig-
nated under this acquisition technique to be the leader
company, and to furnish assistance and know-how under an
approved contract to one or more designated follower
companies, so they can become a source of supply.
[Ref. 13:part 17, p. 10]
Limitations to this methodology are [Ref. 13: part 17,
p. 10] :
The leader company has the necessary production know-
how and is able to furnish required assistance to
the follower(s).
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No other source can meet the Government's requirements
without the assistance of a leader company.
*
The assistance required of the leader company is
limited to that which is essential to enable the
follower (s) to produce the items.
It is authorized in accordance with agency procedures.
The FAR also provides several ways in which the procuring
contracting officer could implement this procedure [Ref. 13:
part 17, p. 10]. First, award a prime contract to the original
source and obligate it to subcontract out to a second source
and assist the second source as needed in the production of
the end items. Second, award a prime contract to the original
producer for assistance to the follower company, and award
another prime contract to the follower company for the produc-
tion of the end items. Finally, as a third approach, award a
prime contract to the follower company obligating it to sub-
contract for the assistance with the leader company. [Ref. 13:
part 17, p. 10]
Advantages to the leader-follower second sourcing methodology
are [Ref. 12:p. 16] :
This provides a method to transfer all or part of
the production of a complex system to a second source.
Competition can still be used to determine the size
of the award split between the two production sources.
The disadvantages to this approach are [Ref. 12:p. 16]:
The leader company may not be as amenable or enthusias-
tic to this method because, unlike the licensor of the
directed licensing arrangement, the leader does not
receive any royalty or assistance fees.
The leader does not receive the kind of protection
provided for under the directed licensing arrangement.
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Contractor teams is the last of the five second sourcing
methodologies currently recognized. Contractor teams provide
for the teaming of two or more contractors in the design of
a system. The team with the best design wins the award and
each contractor within the winning team is then required to
demonstrate the ability to produce a complete system. [Ref.
12:p. 16]
Advantages to this second sourcing methodology are [Ref.
12:p. 16]
:
Qualification of the second source should be essentially
eliminated since both sources collaborated on the
original design.
Trade secrets or proprietary data problems associated
with technology transfer are not problems since both
sources already possess this kind of data.
There should be more design effort and talent utilized
in this approach. As a result, more innovation and a
better chance of design success should be expected in
the development of the system.
Disadvantages to contractor teams include [Ref. 12 :p. 16]:
The need for a great deal of cooperation and coordina-
tion between the contractors of the winning team.
The cost of the design phase of the proposals may be
greater due to the fact that there are two or more
design teams involved.
The strategy of "breakout" has also been implied as a
second sourcing strategy [Ref. 14:part 5, p. 3]. This should
be clarified. "Breakout" is designed to eliminate the "middle-
man" when purchasing spares. This does not create a second





This chapter has presented the structure in which the
Government purchases its major weapon systems. The Major
Weapon System Acquisition process was presented and the market-
place in which it operates was examined. The concepts of
price and production competition were distinguished and
several second sourcing methodologies to establish production
competition were presented.
The next chapter will present the technical data package
(TDP) second sourcing methodology in more detail, some of
the current issues and problems with its use, lessons
learned, and several models describing when the TDP concept
is best suited for use in production competition.
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III. THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE
A. DEFINITION
The technical data package (TDP) is a technical descrip-
tion of an item adequate for use in procurement. This des-
cription assures the adequacy of item performance and defines
the design configuration. The technical data package consists
of plans, drawings, and associated lists, specifications,
standards, models, performance requirements, quality assurance
provisions and packaging data and may range from a single line





1 . Procurement Package
The technical data package must be incorporated into
a procurement package prior to an acquisition. The procure-
ment package contains the information required to obtain bids
or proposals. The procurement package contains the TDP,
administration, legal, and fiscal provisions required for the
definitization of a contractual arrangement between the
Government and the seller. [Ref. 15 :p. 98]
The procurement package is then used in a competitive
environment to obtain identical items. MIL-STD 885B defines
this type of data as design disclosure data [Ref. 16:pp. 4-5].
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MIL-STD 885B also defines three other uses for the procurement
package, two of which are concerned with the competitive use
of form, fit, and function data for interchangeable parts or
for the use in directed procurements. The fourth and final
use of the procurement package is in sole source procurements.
2
.
Importance of the TDP
Since the TDP is the essential document for the pro-
curement of military items, its importance is critical. The
TDP ' s clarity, completeness, adequqcy, and accuracy are prime
considerations in determining the method of procurement to be
used, the degree of competition obtainable, and the success
of the effort to obtain the item with the requisite quality
and reliability. [Ref. 18:part 1, p. 14]
A TDP that is incomplete, inconsistent or defective
can cause legal, economic, and administrative problems such as
[Ref. 18:part 1, p. 4]
:
increased contract price




less than optimum operational or combat effectiveness
3. Uses of the TDP
In addition to the above discussion, TDP ' s are also
important because of the procurement, production, and equipment
operational areas. Some of the uses the TDP has are [Ref. 18;
part 1, p. 4]
:
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as a technical evaluation and analysis tool for the
engineer
as the contracting officer's medium of providing for
competition
as the contractor's basis for submitting bid proposals,
make or buy decisions, cost estimating, vendor item
purchasing, specialty house procurement, and production
engineering
as the Government quality assurance representative's
(QAR) guide for inspection and acceptance
as the basis for determining maintenance policy and the
allocation, the cataloging, and the development of supply
support.
The main purpose for the TDP is the manufacture of an
item as described in the TDP. The QAR will use the TDP as
the basis for the Government's acceptance of the item.
4. Levels of the TDP
There are three levels of the TDP [Ref. 19:pp. 4-5].
These three levels correlate directly with the major weapon
system acquisition phases discussed in Chapter II. Level I
data are those engineering drawings and associated lists used
in the Concept Exploration, Demonstration and Validation,
and the Engineering subphase of the Full Scale Development
phase. This level of data is used to verify the preliminary
design and engineering as well as confirm the technological
feasibility of the item. It also provides for a developmental
design for hardware, and test or experimentation. [Ref. 19:
p. 12]
Level II data is used when the item has progressed to
the Full Scale Development and the Production and Deployment
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phases. This level supports the ability to manufacture a
production prototype and limited production models in final
form suitable for field test, deployment, and logistics
support. [Ref. 19:pp. 3,12]
Finally, Level III data can also be used in both the
Full Scale Development and Production and Deployment phases.
It consists of those engineering drawings and associated lists
that allow a competent manufacturer to produce and maintain
quality control of an item interchangeable with those of the
original design without resorting to additional product design
effort, data, or recourse to the original design activity. This
level of engineering drawings shall provide for:
end item reflection
quantity production
the allowance of competitive procurement of items
that will be substantially identical to the original
item.
Level III data provides for the highest level of confidence
in the reprocurement of items. [Ref. 19: pp. 3,4,12]
C. CONSIDERATIONS AND ISSUES
Prior to further discussion, there are several considera-
tions and issues one must take into account before using the
TDP second sourcing methodology. These include the validation
of the TDP, the rights in technical data, and some lessons
learned in the procurement, maintenance, and use of the TDP
as a second sourcing methodology.
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1. TDP Validation
The validation of the TDP is recognized to be a con-
trolled process that certifies the acceptability of the
competitive acquisition data package. This provides for a
lower risk, of technology transfer and competitive procure-
ment of hardware from industry. [Ref. 20:part 1]
The use of a properly validated TDP in a competitive
procurement provides for lower life cycle costs in that com-
petition should be able to lower the costs of equipment,
systems, spares, and repair parts [Ref. 20:part 2]. Also,
life cycle costs will be reduced in that items that are iden-
tically produced by a second source will stabilize the cost
of training, operation, maintenance data, and support equipment
Costs are also reduced because of the elimination of research
and development that would be associated with a new design
effort. This form of competitive acquisition also increases
the industrial base, avoids sole source problems such as "lock
ins" and data rights, and provides for stabilized logistics
programming. [Ref. 20:part 2]
Government and joint Government-industry TDP validation
can also provide for the technical expertise to reside within
the Government. This is especially beneficial when it comes
time to evaluate and negotiate second source contracts, provide
technical assistance to the second source, and better evaluate
and negotiate the costs of configuration changes. [Ref. 20:
part 2, p. 3]
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One must always consider validation of the TDP under
the following situations [Ref. 20:part 3, p. 4]:
when there appears to be requirements for large quan-
tities of the item and multiyear procurements. This will
usually necessitate that the producer develop a Level
III data package in accordance with DOD-D-1000B. The
cost of this package should be overcome by the effects
of competition.
when the item is in the transitional stage between the
Government laboratory and the producer. Prototypes and
model shops normally are used as the method of develop-
ing a workable model of a system. As such, there is
usually far less production type documentation available
for the producer to use. Validation is used on laboratory-
produced data packages in an effort to provide the needed
engineering drawings and associated lists for use in
volume production.
when the item is being transitioned to a competitively
selected second source from a sole source producer.
When purchasing from a sole source, one is dependent upon the
price, quantity, quality and delivery schedule of the sole
source. The goal is to utilize a broader segment of the
industrial base on a fixed price, competitive basis while
ensuring consistent reliability and the interchangeability of
the items procured. However, there are problems associated
with this transition. First, the original producer sees the
use of a second source as a threat to his current position
and the future follow-on business of spare parts sales.
Consequently, he has no real incentive to provide a complete
and accurate TDP. Second, as a carryover from the first prob-
lem, the original producer will incorporate proprietary parts,
processes, and specifications, and not provide sufficient
detail in the TDP to allow for a second source to produce the
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item. Finally, as a result of the above two problems, the
TDP will not be sufficient to produce an identical item. The
use of a performance specification would then be required to
work around the deficient area(s) in the TDP. This approach
presents its own problems including [Ref. 20:part 3, p. 5]:
the cost of new supplier providing the missing parts
of the TDP and the possibility of having to contend
with his proprietary data
the cost of testing and qualifying the design and its
attendant delays in delivery
the additional cost of inventory required to support not
only the item of the original producer but also the item
of the new supplier
Appendix A provides a basic guideline to determine whether or
not validation is appropriate for a particular TDP. This is
not designed to be all inclusive [Ref. 20:part 6].
At the Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis, Indiana,
there are five methods of technical data package validation
recognized and used [Ref. 20:pp. 9-10]. Method 1 is a desk top
drawing audit that assures the data package is in accordance
with MIL standards and is complete. This method does not
assure that the item detailed will be producible or will
function as required. Use of this method should be limited to
simple, unsophisticated, and low risk items.
Method 2 is a desk top drawing audit that also includes
a configuration audit review of the items produced to determine
the degree of conformance of these items to the data package.
Due to the small sample of items taken, this method does not
usually provide assurance that the technical data represent
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the item nor does it provide for any insight into the processes
used by the original source to produce the item.
Method 3 is a desk top drawing audit and a configura-
tion audit review followed by a real time audit of the
contractor. This audit consists of a random selection and
test of the contractor's make and buy parts, measuring them
against the technical data, and assembling the parts and
testing them against the function specifications. This audit
also includes an onsite survey of such things as manufacturing
processes, documentation, and facilities.
Method 4 is a desk top drawing audit followed by the
actual manufacture and test of a realistic number of items
using the provided TDP . This method provides for the highest
assurance (lowest risk) that the TDP provided to the second
source is producible.
Method 5 is a combination of Methods 3 and 4. Low
risk items are validated using Method 3 where as the high
risk items use the costlier Method 4 for validation.
The validation process is used to accomplish the
following [Ref. 20:p. 11]:
assure the TDP is complete and accurate to allow
for item replication
assure that the TDP will provide the required manufac-
turing processes for use by the second source
assure that the design will provide sufficient quanti-
ties during production to meet military cost constraints
and quantity requirements
assure that item testing is defined and that specifi-
cations allow for mass production
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assure that the TDP possesses the requisite detail to
allow for procurement of parts and material from
multiple suppliers in a timely and cost-effective
manner
Appendix B gives a comparison of the five validation methods
[Ref . 20:pp. 13-15]
.
2. The Rights in Technical Data
No discussion of the technical data package would be
complete without mentioning data rights. It is not the intent
of this thesis to provide an in-depth analysis of this issue,
however, this researcher feels that it is important that the
reader have an appreciation of this issue when considering
the use of the TDP as a second sourcing methodology.
Historically, the data rights issue started in the
1950 's. The 1955 Armed Forces Procurement Regulation (ASPR)
data rights clause afforded no protection for the contrac-
tor's privately developed data [Ref. 21:p. 2]. The clause
simply allowed the Government to disclose any data provided
for any Government purpose. In 1957, responding to the con-
cerns of industry, the DOD updated the data rights clause that
provided for limited and unlimited rights in technical data.
Unlimited rights gave the Government the right to disclose data
in any manner or form it saw fit. Limited rights require the
Government to gain permission of the contractor prior to the
use of this data for manufacturing or procurement of spares.
[Ref. 21:p. 2]
Still dissatisfied, industry sought further changes
the following year. The 19 58 clause allowed contractors to
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exempt from the data package information pertaining to com-
mercial items or items developed at private expense [Ref.
21:p. 3]. This clause defined proprietary data as the
contractor's secrets of manufacture that could not be
discerned from product inspection and which were protected
by the contract from unrestricted use by others. This
protection was afforded to prime as well as subcontractors.
As a result of this clause, there were many disputes over
the number of "holes" in the technical data (then known as
the "swiss cheese" effect). Consequently, in 1964, the data
rights clause was revised into what is the basis of today's
policy. The clause still distinguished between limited and
unlimited rights, however, it dropped the proprietary data
concept. In place of that, the clause introduced the con-
cepts of "unpublished" and "developed at private expense" as
tests of limited rights. This was the first time a clause
definitized the conditions under which the Government had
unlimited rights and the contractor could limit Government
use and disclosure. This clause generally required the con-
tractor to furnish all data and identify which data had
limited rights. This precludes the "holes" in the data
package discussed above. [Ref. 21:pp. 3-4]
OMB Circular A-109 has innovation and competition as
two primary goals in defense acquisitions. Implied in the
above historical perspective is that balance between achieving
unlimited rights for competition while ensuring innovation
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in industry by the protection of its data. It is precisely
this balance that makes data rights an issue when using TDP
as a second sourcing methodology.
Other concerns in the limited rights area includes
[Ref . 20:p. 7]
:
Government-owned TDP ' s must be free of limited rights
to ensure true competition from multiple sources
items that are sole source may be produced by companies
with limited production capacity, possibly constricting
the requirements of the Government
sole source contractors can set their own cost and
schedule factors without regard to unit prices or delivery
limited rights must be identified early and justified
to minimize or eliminate their effects in the competi-
tive acquisition process
The most effective way to resolve any technical data
rights problem is to plan early in the acquisition the identi-
fication, negotiation, and/or predetermination of limited
rights. This process also includes challenging any limited
data rights not fully justified or suspect for other reasons.
[Refs. 22,23]
It should be noted that predetermination of rights in
technical data can be a lengthy process involving extended
periods of time. To ensure valid limited data rights, the
contractor must have time to gather evidence in support of
his position. This could cause contract award delays. Also,
in order for the Government to acquire the unlimited rights
in limited data, it must be shown in writing that [Ref. 24:
p. 89] :
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there is a clear need for the reprocurement of the
item, component, or process to which the technical
data relates
no acceptable substitute is available
- the data in question is sufficient to permit a compe-
tent party to manufacture the items or components in
question or to perform a process without the need for
additional data not obtainable at a reasonable cost
the anticipated net savings in reprocurements will exceed
the cost of the technical data and the associated rights
Several alternatives to the above process of prede-
termination may help cut some of the time off an already
lengthy acquisition process. First, the Government could place
in the Request for Proposals (RFP) an option for the acquisi-
tion of unlimited rights in limited rights data. The time
factor is reduced because the Government does not challenge
the contractor's claim to limited rights or exercise the option
to acquire the rights until the need for it arises. [Ref. 24:
p. 90]
A second approach, similar to the first but for non-
negotiated contracts, requires the contractor to price out
the unlimited rights in limited rights data as a separate
line item in the Invitation for Bids (IFB) instead of a priced
out option in the RFP above. This approach allows for the
Government to compare the costs of unlimited rights for
limited rights data between the bidders. Also, competitive
pressures usually dictate more reasonable prices of these
rights. [Ref. 24;p. 90]
If the Government finds itself in a strong negotiating
position, it could use a clause requiring the unlimited
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rights of limited rights data submitted under the contract
as long as the Government procures a minimum amount of the
item from the contractor. Also, a "non-use" agreement would
be used to a second source, which allows the data to be used
only on that second source contract. [Ref. 24 :p. 91]
As a final approach to cut down the time factor dic-
tated by the predetermination process, is the acquisition of
a licensing agreement from the original contractor. Thus, a
special clause in the RFP for the pricing out of a license
allows the Government to deliver limited rights data to other
supply sources as the Government sees fit. [Ref. 24 :p. 91]
The Government finds itself at a disadvantage if there
is no competitive pressure on the contractor to reasonably
price out his limited rights. This is why early planning is
emphasized. However, when this cannot be accomplished (i.e.,
break out of spare parts) , the Government must ensure the
validity of any limited rights data claims. Challenging the
contractor is about the only approach available. In those
cases where valid limited rights data arise, several alterna-
tives exist to mitigate their impact. First, for those items
not equipment essential, then alternate sources for similar
items may be feasiable [Ref. 20 :p. 7]. Another approach would
be to reverse engineer the item in question to determine its
performance parameters [Ref. 20:p. 7]. Another source could
then be developed to make the items to meet those parameters
[Ref. 20 :p. 7]. It should be noted that case law prohibits
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the obtaining of competition by using reverse engineering
from drawings with proprietary data (Comp. Gen. Dec. B-153941,
Aug. 27, 1964, Unpub.).
Advantages to obtaining data rights include the ability
to create a second source in out-year procurements. Also, the
dependency on a sole source is lessened. Disadvantages of
data rights include cost. Even if the contractor agrees to
unlimited rights in the contract, the cost can be substantial
to acquire and maintain it. One contractor interviewed esti-
mated the Level III data package added another 50% to the base
contract [Ref. 25]. Also, a more insidious disadvantage is
the false sense of security a data package can provide. Even
when validated by an independent organization, the second
source may still not be able to perform to the data package due
to unincorporated technical data changes, lack of experience,
or references to proprietary materials or processes [Ref. 20:
part 5 , p. 19 ]
.
3 . Lessons Learned
In a study done of 100 actual procurement actions
[Ref. 26] , there were five main categories of deficiencies
discovered: accuracy, adequacy, currency, completeness, and
clarity. These are defined as follows [Ref. 18:part 1, p. 13]:
Accuracy: freedom from mistake or error, correctness
Adequacy: the documentation will be evaluated in terms
of the purpose and design of the system or equipment
being developed or produced and also in relation to
standard engineering and design practices, or, if the
item was delivered within the acceptable time, dollar,
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and performance boundaries, then it can be said the
TDP was adequate.
Currency: the contractor's quality program will assure
that obsolete drawings and other out-of-date material
are removed from all points of issue and that only
current documentation is delivered to the service.
Completeness: the documentation 'will, under the con-
tractor's quality assurance procedures, be reviewed to
ascertain that it provides all the information needed
for the purpose intended,
Clarity: there are four subsets to this discrepancy
clarity— the quality or state of being clear: lucidity
legibility—capable of being read or deciphered
conciseness—marked by brevity of expression or
statement
definitive— serving to provide a final solution:
conclusive, authoritative, and apparently
exhaustive; serving to define or specify
precisely
D. CURRENT MODELS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS
The intent of this section is to provide the reader with
a brief description of several models discovered during this
research effort. The first model, known as the Second Sourcing
Method Selection Model (SSMSM) , was developed as the result
of a Master's Thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1979.
The other model has been developed more recently by a Naval
Air Systems Command industrial fund activity, the Naval Avionics
Center (NAC) in Indianapolis, Indiana. This model is entitled
3 3 3the F /D Acquisition Decision Process (F — form, fit, and
3function; D --detailed design disclosure)
.
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1. Second Sourcing Method Selection Model (SSMSM)
The SSMSM model is a heuristic model using a matrix
format. It consists of 14 decision variables that help
evaluate which of five second sourcing methodologies (form,
fit, and function; technical data package; leader-follower;
directed licensing; or contractor teams) would prove most
effective. At best, the model will present one method that
is clearly superior. At worst, the model may eliminate only
one or two of the methods. The model is currently being
evaluated for preliminary use. [Ref. 12 :p. 18]
The model is actually made up of two matrices, one
for the pre-production phase and the other for the post-
production phase. The former is designed to help the program
manager develop his acquisition strategy as it relates to
competition. Ideally, this decision will be made before the
Full Scale Development phase, the DSARC II decision point.
The post-production model is for use by those programs that are
already in the Production and Deployment phase. The distinc-
tion is made between the pre- and post-production phases
because the effectiveness of each of the decision variables
may be changed [Ref. 12:p. 18]. Indeed, it has been shown
in one cost model that the timing of developing a second source
can be especially crucial if the goal of the second sourcing
strategy is to cut program costs as well as its more tradi-
tional goal of increasing the industrial base [Ref. 27 :p. 20]
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Presented below will be a brief summary of the 14
decision variables. The entire model can be found in Appendix
C. At the end of this presentation, a general analysis of the
model and a more specific discussion of the decision variables
as they relate to the TDP second sourcing methodology will
be presented.
The decision variables include the following items
[Ref. 12:pp. 16-18].
a. Quantity to be Procured
The quantity to be procured will have an effect on
the program's adaptability to second sourcing. Usually, the
more items procured, the greater the benefit of competition if
cost savings are desired. Conversely, the smaller the quantity,
the benefits of competition using second sourcing will not be
as great and, in fact, program cost may increase. In this case
the goal of second sourcing may only be that of increasing the
industrial base.
b. Duration of Production
The longer the duration of production, the more
practical second sourcing becomes. If it takes time to develop
a second source (i.e., two years), then a program with planned
procurements for only four years may not reap the benefits
of competition.
c. Slope of the Learning Curve
If the production learning curve is relatively
flat, then a second sourcing may be feasible in that the original
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producer may not be too far down the learning curve. This
allows the second source to produce an item almost as effi-
cient as the original source. However, a learning curve that
has a steep slope may put the potential second source at too
great a disadvantage relative to the original source. This is
true because of the efficiency and experience gained by the
original source.
d. Complexity of the System
As the system becomes more complex, interaction
between the sources of production becomes more essential.
e. Other Potential Government and Commercial
Applications
Items with wide commercial or Government applica-
tion will most likely be protected with trade secrets or pro-
prietary data claims of the contractor. On the other hand,
potential second sources will be interested in items of this
sort.
f. Degree of Privately Funded R&D
The more a contractor spends on private research
and development, the more reluctant he will be to provide the
design to a second source, especially if there are no restrictions
to the use of the design.
g. Cost of Unique Tooling/Facilities
As the cost for special tooling, special facili-
ties, as well as other non-recurring and start-up costs in-
crease, the less likely a second source will be able to supply
in a cost-effective manner. The full amortization of these
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costs will be difficult to achieve over the duration of the
program.
h. Cost of Transferring Unique Government-Owned
Tooling/Equipment
If it is too expensive or difficult to transfer
unique Government-owned tooling or equipment to a second
source, it may be necessary to provide a duplicate set of
tools or equipment to the second source. As this cost in-
creases, it can work against the adaptability of a program for
second sourcing.
i. Contractor Capacity
Insufficient capacity of the original source may
require the establishment of a second source to ensure delivery
schedules are met. If, on the other hand, the original con-
tractor has sufficient or excess capacity, the cost of estab-
lishing a second source may be excessive because of the
additional overhead burden placed on the units procured,
j . Maintenance Concept to be Employed
Maintenance considerations will have a significant
impact on whether or not to use second sourcing. If items
procured are interchangeable, but not identical, it becomes
increasingly difficult and costly to support these items with
field-level repair parts and maintenance personnel.
k. Production Lead Time
It will become increasingly difficult to justify
the use of second sourcing as the production lead time increases
relative to the program life expectancy.
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1. Amount and Type of Subcontracting
With a small base of qualified subcontractors to
depend upon, the effects of competition and second sourcing
are limited.
m. Contractual Complexity
Contractual arrangements such as warranty agree-
ments, design-to-cost considerations, and life cycle cost
parameters greatly increase the complexity of the contract
and can inhibit the second sourcing process.
2. Detailed Analysis of the SSMSM Model
There are several comments about the model this re-
searcher would make. First, the inclusion of some decision
variables provide the user with no means of ranking the five
second sourcing methods. Specifically, decision variables
such as contractual (contractor) complexity, production lead
time, contractor capacity, and Government tool transfer cost
are all given equal ranking. Therefore, while it may deter-
mine if a program is suitable for competition, it does nothing
for evaluating which of the methods is best suited for second
sourcing. This leads into another observation which this re-
searcher finds as an omission on the part of the model. There
should be some kind of analysis of the program and its acqui-
sition strategy prior to the choosing of a second sourcing
methodology to ensure the program is ready for competition.
Issues such as validation of the data packages, data rights,
and market analysis should be resolved. These issues, as well
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as the decision variables of state of the art, technical com-
plexity, and degree of private R&D, have a significant influ-
ence on the method chosen.
In the analysis of the specific decision variables,
there are several problems in the ranking of the TDP methodology
The technical complexity decision variable ranks TDP as being
undesirable. This is not necessarily true. The TDP is well
suited to the second sourcing of complex items if the TDP has
been properly validated. Examples of this include the Navy's
AN/AYK-14 standard airborn computer and the HARM command launch
computer. [Ref. 28: p. 3]
Technical state of the art also suggests that TDP is
inappropriate. The fact is, it is highly desirable to use a
validated TDP to address technological and producibility con-
cerns in order to transfer technology to a second source.
[Ref. 29:p. 12]
The degree of private R&D suggests that TDP is inappro-
priate. However, if the issue of data rights is approached
early and directly and, using techniques discussed earlier to
minimize the impact of valid data rights, then the TDP approach
may be appropriate.
Complex maintenance requirements does not address
the three levels of maintenance used by the Navy nor does it
discuss the items procured that are identical in nature. A
TDP is highly desirable for any maintenance actions done
organically.
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Finally, the model states that if there is heavy
subcontracting, then the TDP is net well suited as a second
sourcing methodology. On the contrary, with a properly
validated TDP, more sources will have a chance to compete
and be certified as a second source producer.
The presentation of the SSMSM Model was provided to
allow the reader the opportunity to examine the decision
variables used in choosing among the second sourcing methodolo-
3 3gies. Next, the Naval Avionics Center's F /D Acquisition
Decision Model is presented as an alternative to the SSMSM
Model.
3 . Form, Fit, and Function/Detailed Design Disclosure
(F-Vd-3) Acquisition Decision Model
This model is more deterministic in nature in that
it uses a flowchart with sequential questions to arrive at
an acquisition approach (using the Acquisition Approach Deci-
sion Model) and then a competitive acquisition strategy
(using the Acquisition Strategy Decision Model) . The term
approach is defined as the method the Government plans to use
to specify the system or component being acquired. Strategy
is a term that represents the Government's plan for ensuring
that more than one producer is ready, willing, and qualified
to respond to a Government solicitation for a specific system
or equipment.
3 3
The F /D Acquisition Decision Model is broken down
into four stages: develop optimum competitive program strategy;
tailor an acquisition approach; tailor a competitive F (form,
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3
fit, and function) or D (detailed design disclosure) strategy;
and application guidelines. Each of these stages will be
discussed briefly, including the questions or attributes each
stage uses in its decision process. The complete model is
provided in Appendix D for review by the reader,
a. Stage One
Developing a competitive environment is a stage
that requires the program manager to make those decisions
early in the acquisition process that will foster a competi-
tive environment and help avoid situations that may limit his
program to a sole source. This first stage has four sections
that are briefly described below.
(1) Review Program Status Prior to FSD . This
section addresses several questions or issues that the program
manager must complete prior to continuing the production compe-
tition process. These requirements include [Ref. 30: part 4,
p. 1] :
all major design tasks have been identified and a plan
prepared to resolve them
firm and realistic performance, cost, and schedule goals
are established
Preliminary Maintenance Concept complete
Test and evaluation plan complete
funding requirements by fiscal year approved and budgeted
limited production or pilot production requirements
determined
acquisition plan complete
practical "fall-back" options and alternatives identified
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(2) Establish Product Baseline . If DSARC II
gives the approval to continue into the FSD phase, then the
following considerations should be reviewed to complete the
product baseline [Ref. 30:part 4, p. 2J
:
complete the engineering development and testing of the
equipment
producing a limited number of units for test and evaluation
implementing a Configuration Management Plan
preparing an Integrated Logistics Support plan (ILS)
updating the Test and Evaluation Master plan (TEMP)
- conducting TECHEVAL and OPEVAL
obtaining Approval for Production
ensuring competitive sources for production units
(3) Competitive Readiness Review . A series of
questions are presented to the program manager to identify any
program weaknesses that may influence the success or failure
of the program. Below is a list of these questions [Ref. 30:
part 4 , pp. 2-7]
:
Market Research. Has market research identified
sufficient industry interest to establish competition?
Technical Availability. Is the technology planned for
the equipment design available as an accepted industry
production process?
Stability of Performance Requirements. Are the perfor-
mance requirements expected to remain stable after initial
production?
Budgeting for Competition. Is sufficient "front end"
funding available to establish competition?
Time/Schedule Constraints. Is there sufficient time in
the schedule to establish production competition to
realize a return-on-investment?
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Character of Support Resources. Is there adequate
technical support and funding available to implement
production competition?
Return-on-Investment. Is a return-on-investment
anticipated?
(4) Production Readiness Decision . If, based
on the above considerations, the program manager feels that
the program is ready for production competition, then he should
proceed to the next stages. If not, he must resolve those
considerations prior to continuing. For those mature programs
already in the Production and Deployment phase, special consider-
ations must be taken into account in order to achieve and
maintain competition,
b. Stage Two
The next stage of the model, selecting an acqui-
sition approach using the Acquisition Approach Decision Model,
3 3defines and compares the F and D acquisition approaches.
This stage is based on the following assumptions [Ref. 30:
part 5 , p. 3]
:
the decision to use production competition will be made
before proceeding into FSD
there will be adequate "front end" funds available for
proper program implementation
3
D equipment configuration control will be maintained
by the Government
the maintenance concept will be established before
proceeding into the next section of this stage
The final section of this stage applies a decision





This Acquisition Approach Decision Model is a flowchart
(Appendix C) that asks a series of questions. Anytime an
answer to a question directs the user to the bottom of the
flowchart, the optimum acquisition approach has been indicated.
The questions are as follows [Ref. 30:part 5, pp. 3-8]:
Maintenance Concept (level-of-repair )
.
What is the target maintenance concept for the equipment?
Is the intermediate level maintenance afloat?
Commercial Developments.
Are there at least two sources of off-the-shelf or modi-
fied commercial equipment available that must meet
the system requirement?
Can lifetime supportability/availability of the equip-
ment be assured?
Funding.
Are sufficient funds available to qualify two or more
sources?
Performance Specifications.
Can a comprehensive performance specification be developed
to the Weapon Replacement Assembly level with a high
degree of confidence?
c. Stage Three
Selecting an acquisition strategy is the third stage
of this model. This is done by using the Acquisition Strategy
Decision Model (Appendix D) . This model associates the acqui-
3 3
sition approach (F or D ) chosen in the previous stage to the
3
acquisition strategy. If the F acquisition approach is pursued,
the strategy model identifies two variations to acquire per-
formance specification: industry-sponsored developments or
3
Government-sponsored developments. If the D acquisition approach
is pursued, there are six acquisition strategies that can be
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used to ensure transfer of technology to a second source.
These six strategies are divided into two categories: indus-
try-led responsibility or Government-led responsibility.
Industry-led strategies include contractor teaming, directed
licensing, and leader-follow. The Government-led strategies
include performance specification/model/available data, inde-
pendently validated data package, and joint industry-Government
validated data package.
Except for the distinction of industry or Govern-
3
ment sponsored development, the F acquisition strategy is
basically the same as that described in Chapter II (which,
incidentally, is based on the SSMSM Model) . The same can be
3
said for the D acquisition strategies of contractor teaming,
directed licensing, and leader-follower. Therefore, these
will not be reexamined.
The TDP second sourcing methodology described in
Chapter II (based on the SSMSM Model) has been divided into
3 3three acquisition strategies under the F /D Acquisition Deci-
sion Model. These are the three Government- led acquisition
strategies listed several paragraphs above. The basic intent
of these strategies is to transfer technology without any
contractor-to-contractor interface. The first of these three
acquisition strategies, performance specification/model/
available data, uses a performance specification along with
the most recent model of the item and all uncertified data
available to produce the item. The level of duplication of
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the item will be consistent with the maintenance philosophy
planned. This strategy gives the advantage of early introduc-
tion of production competition and is conceptually simple to
apply. Disadvantages include potentially significant contrac-
tor lead time to develop production capability, substantial
Government involvement to resolve conflicts and issues, perfor-
mance/cost/schedule risks proportionate to technical complexity
of the item, and requires a stable design. Variations to
this strategy are the use of Level I or II data, Level III
data (possibly verified independently) and warranted data from
the developer. [Ref. 30:part 6, pp. 5-6]
The second Government-led acquisition strategy is the
independently validated data package [Ref. 30:part 6, p. 6],
It makes use of the performance specification, the most recent
model of the item, and a Government validated data package.
All rights to data are procured and a Level III data package
is validated. Special emphasis is placed on documenting any
configuration changes. This strategy reduces the risk of
technology transfer, weakens the developer's leverage over the
Government during competition, Government agencies develop in-
house knowledge of the item, competition efforts are greatly
enhanced, and limited rights in data issues are resolved.
Disadvantages [Ref. 30:part 6, p. 7] include the erosion of
benefits generated by competition due to the cost of validation
and the longer period of time to achieve production competition,
extensive efforts and facilities are required of the Government
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to perform the data package validation, and the Government is
responsible for data package defects. Variations on this
strategy would be to what level (or which method) the valida-
tion process would be performed and whether or not to use a
contractor as an independent source of validation.
The third Government led acquisition strategy is the
joint Government-industry validated data package [Ref. 30:
part 6, p. 8]. This strategy also uses the performance speci-
fication, the most recent model of the item, and available
data. However, this is provided to both the potential source
and the Government validation team. The Government procures
all data and data rights, the Government and the contractor
concurrently perform validation and development of a Level
III data package. This strategy provides all of the same
advantages as the previous strategy as well as providing the
lowest possible technical risk in achieving technology trans-
fer, reduces Government risk of data package defects, fosters
the second source process to develop naturally and introduces
the threat of production competition early on in the acquisi-
tion process [Ref. 30:part 6, p. 8]. Disadvantages of this
acquisition strategy are basically the same as the above inde-
pendently validated data package strategy [Ref. 30:part 6, p. 8].
The Acquisition Strategy Decision Model has a strategy
flowchart for each of the acquisition approaches developed in
3the second stage. The F part of this model uses the following
decision criteria to determine industry or Government sponsored
development programs [Ref. 30:part 6, pp. 9-11]:
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Is commercial off-the-shelf or moderately modified
equipment available?
Are there at least two sources, or can two sources be
developed for the commercially available equipment?
Is time delay compatible with Government requirements?
3
The D model uses the following decision criteria to
determine which of the six acquisition strategies should be
used [Ref. 30:part 6, pp. 11-15]:
Will the equipment use a technology or production tech-
nique that is very difficult to apply or transfer?
Will the complexity require the design/development
capabilities of two or more contractors?
Would any contractor claim sole proprietary ownership
of techniques, processes or designs?
Will the direct assistance and know-how of the
developing company be required to transfer the tech-
nology to another source and can the developer be
motivated to provide the assistance within reasonable
financial limits?
Will the equipment design be reasonably simple, stable
and use a mature technology and will a reasonable
data package be available?
Could an independent and objective validation of
the developer's data package be performed and is the
actual introduction of competition time critical?
d. Stage Four
The actual application guidelines of the above
acquisition strategies are considered the fourth and final
stage of the F /D Acquisition Decision Process. The reader





4 . Detailed Analysis of the F /D Acquisition Decision
Process
The model itself is very comprehensive, touching on
many more issues than this researcher uncovered during program
office interviews. One strength is the model's notion of
acquisition (or data) approach as an independent decision
process, closely related to, but separate from, the acquisition
strategies.
Another strong point of this model is the series of
steps used to ensure a program is ready for competition. Also,
the logical flow of the entire model aids the program manager
to better organize his activities, prepare for upcoming issues,
and avoid any problems that could trap him into a sole
source procurement.
Finally, the model in general seems to have an appre-
ciation for the fact that the acquisition strategy or plan is
a constantly evolving, "living" document. Program and item
characteristics may always change as the program moves forward
in the major weapon system acquisition process.
The addition of a post-production model or set of deci-
sion criteria would make this model even more useful. Those
programs past the FSD phase may still benefit from competition.
This is true because many programs that were initially planned
to run only a few years, often continue in production for
many more [Ref. 9].
As this model relates to the TDP second sourcing
methodology described in Chapter II, one can clearly see that
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this method is broken down into three acquisition strategies;
performance specification/model/available data, independently
validated data package, and joint industry-Government vali-
dated data package. Combined, these three strategies present
the significant variations and issues to be considered in using
the TDP second sourcing methodology.
5 . Comparison of the SSMSM Model and the F /D Acquisition
Decision Model
The SSMSM Model does well in presenting major economic,
technological, and programmatic factors to the program manager.
It is also a beneficial model in that it relates these factors
to both the pre-production and post-production phases of a
program.
3 3
The F /D Acquisition Decision Model, as stated earlier,
is a much more comprehensive framework. It does well in guid-
ing the program manager in a logical, sequential process that
ensures a program is first ready for competition, and then
identifies the proper acquisition approach and strategy. This
3,3
is one big advantage over the SSMSM Model. The F /D Acquisi-
tion Decision Model also points out a new classification scheme
3 3
that distinguishes the acquisition approach (F or D ) as
independent of the fact that competition may or may not be
used. This model should be extended to cover more mature
programs already in the post-production phase.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter defined the TDP, why it is important in the
acquisition process, and several key issues that should be
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identified and resolved prior to its use as a production
competition second sourcing methodology. Also, this chapter
briefly presented several second sourcing models and their
respective decision variables and attributes. The next





The intent of this section is to present two programs
that have used the Technical Data Package (TDP) second
sourcing methodology. This will provide the reader with
actual applications of the TDP second sourcing methodology.
During these presentations, the various issues and decision
variables discussed in Chapter III will be identified.




This presentation will be based upon program office
interviews, analysis of program acquisition plans, and a
research project and report performed by the BDM Corporation
under several Joint Cruise Missiles Project Office contracts.
The latter source of information is especially useful for it
provides a long term perspective over the entire second
sourcing effort of the AIM-7F SPARROW missile.
2 History
The program office for the SPARROW missile (generic
name for all versions of this missile) was established in 1951
This all-weather tactical missile was assigned then to the
Navy's F-3B interceptor in 1955 and the F-4B interceptor in
1956. [Ref. 31:p. 4]
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All of the development and production effort for the
SPARROW missile had been accomplished by the Raytheon Company.
Under production since 1958, the missile has undergone several
major improvements [Ref. 31:p. 4]. Each of these improvements
increased the operational envelope of the missile. However,
due to the vacuum design, the missile experienced low opera-
tional availability. The upgrade from the AIM-7E-2 to the
AIM-7F was to incorporate new solid state electronics in an
effort to improve this operational availability. The use of
smaller electronics also provided for the use of a larger war-
head and boost-sustain motor. [Ref. 32 :p. 3]
The AIM-7F upgrade efforts took considerably more time
than was originally estimated, extending over a period of
eight years. It was near the end of this development effort
(19 71) that the Navy decided to second source the program.
Appendix E gives a time line of the development history of the
AIM-7F SPARROW missile [Ref. 32:p. 4].
3 . Missile and Documentation Characteristics
The second sourcing effort of the AIM-7F SPARROW' missile
will be limited to the guidance and control (G&C) assembly.
Appendix F illustrates the principal elements of the G&C
assembly (shaded) which represents almost 90% of the total
missile cost [Ref. 32:p. 5]. The SPARROW missile is designed
to be used on the F-4, F-14, and the F-15 aircraft. It is an
all-weather, radar guided, semi-active, air-to-air/ship-to-
air missile used by the Air Force and the Navy [Ref. 33:p. 11].
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The AIM-7F SPARROW G&C assembly is made up of over 100 modules,
with 5000 electronic parts, 20,000 solder joints, and 1,000
mechanical parts. The documentation on the G&C assembly has
over 1200 drawings, 150 material and process specifications,
and 120 critical item function specifications [Ref. 32 :p. 6].
4. Rationale for Second Sourcing
The reasons for second sourcing the AIM-7F SPARROW
missile should look familiar if one considers the decision
variables and attributes discussed in Chapter III. First, the
cost of the 7F version was projected at twice the cost of the
7E version. In an effort to reduce this cost, the use of
competition was deemed appropriate. [Ref. 32 :p. 7]
Second, the planned requirements for the Navy and the
Air Force was for over 10,000 missiles over a production run
of six to ten years. This production quantity and duration
allowed for the recoupment of non-recurring costs due to the
second sourcing program. Also, since the requirements were
from both the Air Force and the Navy, industrial base concerns
became an issue because of the desire for ensured production
availability and expansion. Finally, the Government perception
at this time was that the SPARROW missile had not improved over
the years (in both performance parameters or operational availa-
bility) as quickly as desired. The lack of contractor/
Government acquisition team incentive was cited as the reason.
With the introduction of competition, the Government felt the
cost of the missile would decrease, while the product's overall
performance and reliability would increase. [Ref. 32 :p. 7]
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Why, then, was the TDP second sourcing methodology (or
3Government led D ) used in this procurement? Interviewees
claim that the desire to maintain configuration control,
develop "in-house" talent to solve technology transfer questions
and issues, and that the missile was using relatively mature
technology, each contributed to the use of the TDP second
sourcing methodology [Ref . 34] . Indeed, the desire to gain
"in-house" expertise was cited as one of the most critical steps
in this second sourcing effort [Ref. 32 :p. 8]. Naval Weapons
Center (NWC) , China Lake, was designated as the center for
validation of Raytheon's critical item functional specifications
and was provided the requisite testing facilities to perform this
function [Ref. 30:p. 8] . Other functions performed by NWC
China Lake included technical cognizance and control of the
data package, Government configuration management for the
program's duration, primary control of engineering change pro-
posals, functional and physical configuration audits, integrated
logistics support, and product assurance/reliability program
reviews [Ref. 32 :p. 9],
5 . Implementation of the Second Sourcing Program
The implementation of the AIM-7F SPARROW missile second
sourcing program was performed in six basic steps [Ref. 32:
p. 8] :
a. establish and maintain valid product baseline
b. bring documentation up to reprocurement data package
quality
c. establish in-house technical cognizance organization
with complete test facilities
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d. screen industry for qualified contractors
e. provide five selected contractors with G&C unit and
data package
f. evaluate proposals and award contract for first article
The first three steps have already been discussed. The fourth
step is a classic example of market research in that the
Government sought out interested companies to produce the AIM-
7F SPARROW missile G&C assembly. Of the thirty one responses
to the "sources sought" announcement in the Commerce Business
Daily , five contractors were eventually selected to examine
the G&C assembly and documentation. In that this fifth step
spanned over a year, the review by five competent contractors
of the GStC assembly and documentation proved highly beneficial
to this second sourcing effort [Ref. 32 :p. 8]. Also, due to
testing and funds delays, the selectee, General Dynamics,
Pamona Division (GD/P) , was provided a planning contract for
an additional year to ensure the progress made to that point
would not be lost. This time was well spent. The data package
of Raytheon was converted to GD/P production plans which
facilitated the eventual contract award of first article and
pilot production units. Appendix G gives a brief summary of
the industry events [Ref. 32 :p. 10].
6 . Cost Effectiveness of the Second Sourcing Effort
This paper previously cited cost reduction as one of
the effects of competition. The BDM study of the AIM-7F
SPARROW missile stated that there was a savings of approximately
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$30 million (about 4% of the total program cost) [Ref. 32:
p. 14] . Appendix H provides a cost summary of sole sourcing
versus second sourcing [Ref. 32:p. 14]. The breakeven point
was approximately 7,000 G&C assemblies and that the cumulative
cost summary was based on a 95% learning curve. Appendix I
provides a graphical representation of this cost information
[Ref. 32 :p. 15]. The 95% learning curve reinforces the flat
learning curve decision variable presented in the SSMSM Model.
Before applying this cost summary information in other
missile programs, several points should be made to qualify
this information as unique to the AIM-7F SPARROW missile
program [Ref. 32:p. 15]. First, the design of the SPARROW
missile had many technical problems. This delayed the data in
which a second source could begin work on a baseline configura-
tion. Second, the availability of an acceptable technical
data package was slowed because not all of the components were
pursued with second sourcing in mind. Third, lack of adequate
data and lack of Government push is cited as causing the lengthy
period of time (2 1/2 years) to select GD/P from the original
list of responses in the Commerce Business Daily . Finally,
the lack of funding caused a delay in getting a second source
on-line and a reduction in program requirements that stretched
out the breakeven point. [Ref. 30 :p. 15]
Other studies have shown that the modest cost savings
from second sourcing the SPARROW missile did not occur at all.
Science Application, Inc. , did a study in 1982 (SAI-82) and,
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based on data at that time, the second sourcing of the G&C
assembly cost an additional 31.4% [Ref. 10:p. 25]. In another
study, the additional cost was estimated at 20.5% [Ref. 10:
p. 36].
7. Problems and Issues of the Second Sourcing Effort
Cost was an issue in this program. More specifically,
a reasonable payback on the $69 million up-front investment
was expected. This investment consisted of $52 million for
GD/P first article, production learning quantity, and tooling
for 100 missiles per month capacity; $6 million for Raytheon to
produce a technical data package; and, $11 million for NWC
China Lake technical cognizance and configuration management
effort. This second sourcing effort, however, was sold more
on the basis of improved missile quality and mobilization base
considerations than recoupment of investment dollars due to
competition. [Ref. 32 :p. 16]
Annual and total program costs were sensitive to the
production rate and procurement quantities. Areas that influ-
enced the procurement quantities and production rate were such
things as annual budgeting, Air Force and Navy requirements,
minimum sustaining rates for Raytheon and GD/P, and foreign
military sales requirements [Ref. 32:p. 16]. As stated earlier,
without stability of program funding, unit costs normally increase
and there will be a program stretchout assuming the original
program requirements are still needed. Other influences included
long lead time material procurements, tooling and test equipment,
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personnel training, and the distribution of fixed costs over
quantities procured [Ref. 32:p. 16].
Another issue in this second sourcing effort was that
of technology transfer. Regardless of the quality of the
technical data package used for reprocurement, the second
source will invariably experience some problems with the
original developer's drawings [Ref. 32:p. 17]. This problem
would fall under the issue of TDP validation.
Proprietary rights surfaced as an issue. The BDM study
gave no specifics on this problem. It only stated that to
effectively deal with proprietary claims, the Government must
understand the contract and procurement regulations. Few
claims will stand up to litigation if there is a complete and
thorough development contract [Ref. 32 :p. 17]. It is obvious
from this discussion that good planning early in the acquisi-
tion process is needed in order to head off any future problems
in the limited rights of data issue.
Intense Government involvement was the last issue
brought out in the BDM study. The technical cognizance, con-
figuration management, and product assurance oversight all
combined to allow NWC China Lake and NAVAIR to deal with the
two contractors, Raytheon and GD/P , as equals.
8 . Lessons Learned
The real worth of the BDM study was to provide a sec-
tion on lessons learned that would aid future program managers
some insight on what to plan for or avoid in their programs.
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The first lesson learned had to do with patience and
time. There should be someone that will be able to stick with
the program for five or more years. Just a small amount of
corporate knowledge goes a long way in avoiding disrupting
influences to the program. Also, patience is required, espec-
ially when one considers the myriad of technical and fiscal
problems imposed on this second sourcing effort. It took
nearly seven years to solicit a second source to the actual
competition of the production units between Raytheon and GD/P
[Ref . 32:p. 18]
.
This first lesson leads into a second; involve the
second source as soon as possible and properly scope his effort.
Even with the considerable effort by the Government to get a
second source early in the program, seven years to create a
qualified second source is considered excessive. Of that seven
years, three to four years were caused by slowness on the
Government's behalf, lack of an adequate technical data package,
problems technologically with the AIM-7F SPARROW missile design,
and fiscal constraints beyond the program manager's ability to
control. [Ref. 32 :p. 18]
Recognizing the importance and dynamic nature of the
technical data package was another lesson learned. Product
design baselining or "freeze" on configuration is nearly
impossible for relatively complex systems. There are always
subtle changes, especially after seven years, that will require
a change to the technical data package. And if those changes
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are not properly documented, then the Government, as the con-
figuration control manager in a TDP second sourcing strategy,
will be liable for the additional costs of the contractor's
effort. [Ref. 32:p. 18]
To ensure a reasonable return on the up-front investment
attendant to the second sourcing of a program, stable planned
requirements is a necessity. Without stable program require-
ments, the effect on unit costs is usually unfavorable, exacer-
bated by the supporting of overhead and fixed costs of two
or more producers. [Ref. 32 :p. 18]
Attention to detail is mandatory when transferring
technology using a technical data package. Literally hundreds
of details and problems had to be resolved in order for FD/P
to use the Raytheon TDP. [Ref. 32 :p. 19]
The importance of configuration management was presented
as a lesson learned in that to have uncontrolled change was
to have uncontrolled cost. The issue of using block changes
was raised. This is considered more efficient and cost effec-
tive than processing individual changes in accordance with MIL-
STD 480. [Ref. 32:p. 19]
Another lesson learned is that there will always be some
people that refuse to believe that second sourcing is a cost
effective way to perform competition [Ref. 32:p. 19]. However,
as discussed in Chapter II, production competition using second
sourcing also may have the goals of increased industrial base,
better product quality, and improved technology.
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The final lesson learned had to do with another possible
second sourcing methodology: leader-follower. The BDM study
cited the fact that NAVAIR up to that time had used leader-
follower one time in a major aircraft equipment item that
eventually resulted in a law suit. Even though this technique
had been used successfully in the Fleet Ballistic Missile
guidance system, NAVAIR stated that leader-follower was not
appropriate in the AIM-7F SPARROW missile program because NAVAIR
did not want an existing deficient design transferred from one
source to another [Ref. 32:p. 19]. The correction of this
deficiency required direct Government involvement over an
extended period of time. As noted by both the SSMSM Model and
3 3
the F /D Acquisition Decision Model, this direct involvement
on behalf of the Government is not the intent of the leader-
follower methodology.
9 . Benefits of the Second Sourcing Program
The goals of this second sourcing effort had been to
reduce program cost while improving the missile's quality
and reliability and to expand the industrial base [Ref. 32:
p. 21] . The reduction of program costs have had different
determinations as stated in the above section on cost effective-
ness. The quality and reliability did improve. In fact, the
operational availability for the AIM-7F SPARROW missile had
doubled from the objective set forth in the Decision Coor-
dinating Paper [Ref. 32:p. 20]. The reason cited by most
people involved with the program was due mainly to the design
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improvements suggested by GD/P. The sole source has no real
incentive to provide innovative solutions or improvements to
his design. Expansion of the industrial base is an obvious
benefit. With two producers, the Government gains the added
capability of surge and mobilization.
As a last benefit cited in the BDM study, contracting
becomes more simplified when using competition. Awards can be
based on price competition alone whereas in sole source procure-
ments, cost and pricing data, use of annual RFP ' s , and
negotiation are required.




This presentation is based on program office interviews,
interviews with a Naval Industrial Fund (NIF) activity, and
review of the source selection plan. Interviews were provided
by the contracting officer, TDP validation project engineer,
and the NIF activity director resource and management.
2 Procurement History
Texas Instruments, Inc. (TI) is the sole source for the
High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) Avionics System. TI
has developed and produced this system since 1974 in conjunc-
tion with their development of the AWG 8 8A HARM System. The
HARM avionics system provides an interface between the missile
and other aircraft avionics. Its purpose is to provide target
identification, prioritization, display functions, and launch
and mode parameters [Ref. 35:part 1, p. 1] . The avionics system,
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specifically, the Command Launch Computer (CLC) , CP 1001/AWG
is currently produced in two versions. One version is to be
installed on the Navy's A-7 while the other is to be installed
on the Navy's A-6E and F/A 18 [Ref. 36].
Due to the cost growth of the avionics system, NAVAIR,
in August 1981, requested Naval Avionics Center (NAC) to
evaluate several acquisition alternatives. The goal was to
establish a competitive environment for the HARM CLC at the
lowest possible risk [Ref. 35:part 1, p. 1]
.
The acquisition alternative was to second source the
HARM CLC. To that end, NAC began a TDP validation in September
1982 to serve as a product baseline for the solicitation
[Ref. 35:part 1, p. 1] . They were also required to manufacture
ten CLC's in 1983 to verify the TI data package [Ref. 35:p. 8].
NAVAIR AIR-05 was issued a Contracting Officer Warrant
on 10 August 1983 which allowed them to act as Source Selection
Authority (SSA) . The SSA, on 23 March 1984, approved the
Source Selection Plan authorizing NAC as the lead activity in
evaluating the competitive proposals. [Ref. 35 :p. 8]
The Request For Proposals (RFP) was issued on 17 May
1984. Of the twenty five solicitees, eight companies showed
interest in the second sourcing of the HARM CLC. A pre-proposal
conference was held at NAC on 26 June 1984 for those interested
companies. Only one compnay, Lear Siegler, Inc., Astronics
Division, Santa Monica, California (LSI) responded with a
proposal by the 13 August 1984 due date. [Ref. 35:p. 8]
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Based on the evaluation of this proposal by the Source
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) , the SSA directed that dis-
cussions and a site survey be accomplished with LSI, any
technical data package changes be provided to LSI, and a Best
and Final Offer (BFO) be solicited from LSI if the results of
the site survey indicated that LSI's proposal could be made
acceptable. [Ref. 35:p. 8]
The evaluation at LSI resulted in a negative pre-award
decision based on quality assurance and production planning
deficiencies and past production history. The Source Selec-
tion Evaluation Board (SSEB) still felt, however, that the LSI
proposal could be made acceptable and recommended solicitation
of the Best and Final Offer (BFO) to the Source Selection
Authority. The SSA approved this recommendation. [Ref. 35:
p. 8]
The award to LSO was made on 11 April 1985. This con-
tract required the fabrication and qualification testing of six
pre-production units. It also required priced production options
for FY-85 (23 units) and FY-86 (31 units). [Ref. 37:p. 1]
3 . HARM CLC and Documentation Characteristics
The HARM CLC is a highly complex item. It consists of
over 100 integrated circuits, 12 layer/multi-layer printed
boards, and an extremely fast processing speed (almost eight
times that of an ordinary micro computer). [Ref. 36]
The documentation is Government owned. Also, the
Government maintains possession of the documentation at NAC.
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The Navy is the configuration manager of the technical data
package (TDP) for the HARM CLC. [Ref. 36]
The TDP itself consists of approximately 250 drawings.
These drawings are considered complex, containing over 2000
individual sheets. [Ref. 36]
The validation process, as stated earlier, was initiated
in September 1982. Budgeted at $4.7 million, the effort not
only provided for the validation of the TI TDP; but, also
included the manufacture of nine employable units (down from
the ten originally planned) . All but one of these units was
to be placed in inventory. The remaining unit was being con-
sidered for use by the second source for qualification purposes.
A Method 4 validation (as explained in Chapter III) was per-
formed by NAC, the most comprehensive of the five methods
available (which results in the lowest risk of technology
transfer) . [Ref. 36]
4 . Rationale for Second Sourcing
One reason for the HARM CLC second sourcing was the
desire to control cost growth of the avionics system. NAVAIR
felt that competition would lower the unit cost charged by
TI. [Ref. 35:p. ii]
Improvement of the HARM CLC quality was also cited as
a goal [Ref. 35 :p. ii] . Although no specific problems were
cited with the TI configuration, a complex item such as the
HARM CLC could almost always be improved in both reliability
and operational availability with another producer reviewing and
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implementing the developer's data package. The second source
almost always introduces new processes, materials, or tech-
nologies to allow the unit to perform at a higher state of
readiness.
This discussion of quality and innovativeness in design
brings out a side issue this researcher feels is important.
Literature is replete with examples of the detriments of over
specification [Ref. 38:pp. 38,40] and that design specifica-
tions are less conducive to innovation than the use of performance
specifications. It is important to remember that even if a
design specification, or TDP , is used as a second sourcing
strategy, innovation is still possible as long as it is consis-
tent with the level of maintenance philosophy (i.e., the innova-
tion to the old design does not impact the repair of the item
or the attendant life cycle cost considerations) [Ref. 29].
If the innovation to the unit's design interferes with the
maintenance philosophy, that innovation could be considered in
3
the realm of a performance specification conducive to the F
second sourcing strategy.
Another reason for the second sourcing of the HARM CLC
was the number of items to be procured [Ref. 40] . A total of
788 HARM CLC ' s are planned to be purchased through the year
1992. Program duration is another consideration as can be
seen by the number of years (six) the program will cover
[Ref. 41:Enclosure 2:p. 4].
Mobilization base considerations was another reason
for the second sourcing effort [Ref. 35:p. ii]
.
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What was the rationale behind using the TDP or the
3Government-led D second sourcing acquisition approach? NAC
stated their rationale behind the Government- led D acquisition
approach was based on the fact that they had the technical
expertise to validate a complex TDP such as the HARM CLC. Also,
NAC's experience over the past several years has been that a
3
contractor-led D acquisition strategy (contractor teaming,
leader-follower, and directed licensing) had a tendency to
increase non-recurring costs. The reason cited was that the
original producer would charge extraordinary fees for tech-
nology transfer in an effort to make up for the projected
lost profits due to competition. NAC feels that they can
validate a data package at a lower cost than the original
producer's technology transfer fees. [Ref. 39]
NAVAIR stated that logistic costs had the biggest
impact on this decision [Ref. 40] . Since so many of the HARM
CLC's were to be purchased, and that they would be serviced in
the fleet for the next twenty years, this would have a tremen-
dous impact on life cycle costs [Ref. 40]
.
The issue of component recall from the fleet was pre-
sented as another reason for the TDP approach. It is extremely
difficult to recall different configurations that a F strategy
will provide. There is the problem of properly identifying not
only which units are in need of recall; but, also, where these
units are deployed. Finally, the software for the test equip-
ment was a standard item and extremely expensive. This precluded
83
the use of any other product design or acquisition strategy
[Ref. 42]
.
5 . Cost Effectiveness of the Second Sourcing Effort
Based on a calendar year 19 83 payback analysis per-
formed by NAVAIR, the total program savings due to the second
sourcing of the HARM CLC was to be approximately $19 million
[Ref. 41:p. 3]. This estimate was based upon the following
assumptions [Ref. 41:p. 3] :
the second source's first production unit costs would
be about $150,000
the learning curve is approximately 90-93% (notice not
a steep learning curve)
qualification costs of the second source would be about
$2.5 million
competition between TI and LSI would begin in FY-86
However, in 1985, these assumptions were changed. The
justification of the proposed price in the source selection
plan presented different unit price and qualification cost
estimates. The NAC estimate for qualification costs had been
revised downward to $1.7-2.0 million. LSI * s original proposal
estimated this to be approximately $2.0 million. In their
Best and Final Offer (BFO) , the proposed qualification cost
was less than $1.3 million. [Ref. 35 :p. 10]
The FY-85 production of 23 units had a unit price
estimate from NAC at $6 7,000. The LSI original proposal had
a unit price of about $55,000 and a BFO unit price of $51,000.
[Ref. 35:p. 10]
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The FY-86 production of 31 units had an even more
favorable impact on unit prices. The NAC unit price estimate
remained the same, $67,000. However, the LSI original pro-
posal had a unit price estimate of just over $52,000 and a BFO
of $47,000. [Ref. 35:p. 10]
The SSEB had concerns with reasonableness and complete-
ness of the final offer by LSI. However, this cost realism
issue was resolved during contract discussions (also, the
proposed unit prices were not that far removed from the NAC
estimates) . Finally, the differences between the original pro-
posal and the BFO were due to the capitalization of special
tooling and test equipment. [Ref. 35 :p. 10]
Another cost savings attributable to this second
sourcing effort was a "no cost" failure free warranty. [Ref.
35:p. 10]
To put all of these numbers in perspective, TI ' s unit
price for the HARM CLC, based on FY-8 4 contract prices on 40
units, was over $150,000 [Ref. 35:p. 10]. The per unit warranty
cost was almost $12,000 [Ref. 37:p. 1]
.
Why were the NAC estimates reduced so dramatically
from the 1983 projections? The best explanation for this is
the possession of the TI TDP. NAC, during its validation
process, can make much better estimates of the materials and
labor required as well as the type of production and test
equipment required [Ref. 39]. This reinforces the notion pre-
sented in the NAC acquisition model in that having in-house
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expertise on a system or component provides for better contract-
ing officer support and cost estimates [Ref. 20:pp. 2-3].
Why was there such a difference between the contract
price of TI and LSI? The SSEB, of which NAC was a member,
concluded that several factors may have influenced this differ-
ence [Ref. 35:pp. 10-11]. First, LSI may have been under the
impression that there were other competitors still in the
running for this contract. Second, there were differences in
manufacturing methods between the two contractors. TI fabri-
cates printed wiring boards and other components that make up
a significant portion of the CLC cost. LSI is a parts inte-
grator, subcontracting for all of the CLC parts. Third, testing
is performed by TI where it is subcontracted by LSI. Therefore,
TI charges off the maintenance costs of its test equipment.
Finally, TI , as the sole source, may maintain an engineering
staff dedicated to the CLC for configuration management. This
would be segregated out in a competitive environment.
6 . Issues and Lessons Learned
The validation effort of the TI technical data package
took longer than originally estimated. Consequently, the
product baseline was not established in advance of the solici-
tation. This caused some problems in the proposal process
[Ref. 42] . The validation process took longer than NAC expected
due mainly to parts availability. As it turned out, TI was
the sole source producer on many of the parts that made up the
CLC [Ref. 36]. The implications of this were that the cost
of the parts are unfavorable, scheduling could be a problem,
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new and unique test equipment and software may be used, and
the validation process could be effected [Ref. 39]. Also, the
lack of a product baseline may add to the technical risk of
the contract proposal [Ref. 42]
.
A way to possibly break this sole source problem of
the original producer on component parts would be to advertise
the fact that a program is to be second sourced. Given enough
advanced notice, industry may be able to seek out or create
new sources as an alternative to the original producer. An
example of this was the second sourcing of the Navy's AN-AYK 14
standard computer. [Ref. 39]
There were several issues cited by the program office
as uncontrollable. These were the warranty clause on major
weapon systems and components (Defense Authorization Act of
1984) and the more recent possible shift in Naval policy that
it would no longer fund special tooling or test equipment
[Ref. 42] . The warranty did impact the TI unit price by
almost $12,000, as mentioned earlier. Fortunately, the special
tooling and test equipment funding issue will not impact LSI's
proposal due to their capitalization of these items.
Physical possession of the master data package is
significant. This allows for better configuration control
and aids in the validation process [Ref. 36]. Having masters
of the data package also helps avoid some of the clarity and
accuracy lessons learned problems (Chapter III).
When working with systems or components that contain
printed wiring boards, arrangements should be made to procure
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the production master artwork of the printed wiring boards.
This picture of the board aids the validation process and it
also is used to provide first generation copies to the second
source. An alternative to this artwork would be to acquire
magnetic tapes. The reason these are presented as a lesson
learned is that this type of documentation is separate from
the Level III technical data package and therefore overlooked.
[Ref. 36]
Another lesson learned is to ensure that the original
developer of a system or component does not reference his
own internal standards or specifications. It is essential,
for the smooth flow of the validation process and the trans-
fer of technology, that military and/or industry standards and
specifications are referenced in the data package of the
original developer. This issue should be resolved in the
development contract. [Ref. 36]
Other issues that should be resolved in the develop-
ment contract are the purchase of the theory of operations
document (provides the complete operational parameters of the
component) and the purchase of hardware for use in the TDP
validation process and for use by the second source in the
qualification process. Therefore, not all items fabricated
in the development phase should be consumed for destructive
testing, inventory, or deployment. [Ref. 36]
Lastly, the dependence of physical configuration
audits should be limited. These audits will usually indicate
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that the contractor's items fall within the confines of his
TDP, however, the reverse is not necessarily true. Therein
lies the problem: the TDP does not necessarily mean that it
can be used to result in an end item. [Ref. 36]
7. Benefits of the Second Sourcing Effort
The completion of a Method 4 validated TDP is a benefit
of this second sourcing effort. It offers one of the lowest
risks in technology transfer for the Government-led D acqui-
sition strategy. Also, this provides an easy means to reprocure
the HARM CLC in future procurements.
Another benefit is the in-house expertise that is now
provided by NAC. As stated earlier, this will help in cost
estimation and negotiation of any proposed engineering changes.
Cost reduction is another benefit of this second
sourcing effort. The 1983 payback analysis estimated a pro-
gram savings of $19 million. Also, as of FY85, the unit price
reduction, "no cost" failure free warranty, and lower than
expected qualification costs are more examples of cost savings.
Finally, the capitalization of the special tooling and test
equipment saved the Navy additional money. Unfortunately,
at the time of this writing, a more current payback analysis
was not available to this researcher that incorporated these
most recent cost changes.
Although no specifics were provided, there were quality
improvements to the HARM CLC as a result of the NAC validation
and the inspection of the TI TDP by the second source, LSI.
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Finally, with the establishment of the new source, the
industrial base will be improved at both the prime and sub-
contract levels. There have already been alternate sources of
supply identified and used by the NAC validation team to break
out those sole source parts made by TI. [Ref. 36]
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented several programs that have used
the TDP second sourcing methodology. The intent of this chap-
ter was to provide the reader with several cases of practical
application to the theory presented in Chapter III. This was
done as an attempt to give the reader an appreciation of the
environment in which the major weapon systems acquisition
process operates. Without this appreciation, the reader may
repeat some of the problems that have already occurred in other
programs. The next chapter is designed to be less descriptive
in nature. Key issues generic to the TDP second sourcing
methodology will be analyzed.
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V. ANALYSIS OF TDP SECOND SOURCING METHODOLOGY ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
The research effort up to this point has been descriptive
in nature. The background and framework were presented to
give the reader an appreciation for the environment in which
the major weapon systems acquisition process operates. The
various second sourcing methodologies were presented, including
two models for their application, and an overview of two pro-
grams that used the TDP second sourcing methodology. The
intent of this chapter is to present key issues generic to the
use of the TDP second sourcing methodology based upon the
theory and practical application previously presented.
B. ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES
1. Technology Transfer
Technology transfer is a broad and key issue that the
program manager must appreciate prior to the use of the TDP
second sourcing methodology. Why? Primarily, since there is
no contractor-to-contractor interface in this methodology,
the Government is responsible for the TDP and the information
therein. Consequently, the program manager, not the original
developer, has to be sensitive to technology transfer issues
such as complexity of the item, product baselining, and con-
tractor qualification. If an item is extremely complex, the
original developer may be the only one able to effectively
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transfer the requisite technology to establish a second source.
The program manager must decide whether or not to take on this
responsibility or use the second sourcing methodologies such
as leader-follower, directed licensing, or contractor teaming.
In that the item is extremely complex, obtaining a baseline
configuration for solicitation purposes may be difficult. The
HARM command launch computer (CLC) had this particular problem.
This had an influence on the amount of time that it took to
obtain and qualify a second source. The SPARROW missile also
had a problem establishing that baseline configuration. There-
fore, to mitigate this problem, the program manager must allow
enough time to establish a stable design in order to establish
a second source in a timely manner. Finally, the technology
transfer process may be affected by the ability of the second
source to produce the item and the extent to which the second
source will have to adapt his production facilities to the TDP.
Interviews have suggested that the cost of rearranging the
second source's facilities may be extremely expensive and
seriously erode the effects of competition. A careful source
selection process will help ensure the capability of the second
source is up to the level required for the TDP.
2. Technical Data Package Validation
A closely related issue to technology transfer is TDP
validation. The program manager should realize the importance
of the validation process as a means to enhance the flow of
technology transfer (stated conversely, TDP validation will
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reduce the risk associated with technology transfer) . What
is the risk and how is it reduced? The risk is the ability of
the second source to understand and produce to a TDP that is
not his own. To reduce this risk, the program manager must
validate the TDP to ensure its completeness, clarity, currency,
accuracy, and adequacy. Also, the format of the TDP will be
more generic in nature and free of contractor in-house referenced
processes and parts. The use of industry and Government standards
and specifications will be included in a properly validated
data package.
The programs that were analyzed in Chapter IV developed
several characteristics of the TDP validation process that
should be presented here. The validation of the TDP can be
very expensive depending on the method of validation used and
the complexity of the item. Consequently, the program manager
should ensure ample funding is available for this process.
Also, as indicated in the HARM CLC, the validation process
itself may run into difficulties. Sole source parts and pro-
prietary processes are something that should be investigated
prior to the validation process. Early planning can help
avoid these contingencies. Otherwise, the implication for not
starting the validation process early is the lack of a product
baseline at the time of the solicitation.
3 . Technical Data Rights
Another TDP second sourcing methodology issue that is
also closely related to the technology transfer process is
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technical data rights. This is an issue because without un-
limited rights in data, the Government will not be able to
effectively transfer the needed technology to a second source
to allow for item replication. Internal or proprietary
processes and/or parts may be referenced in the TDP. This was
one of the lessons learned in the HARM CLC.
Another reason that data rights is an issue is the cost
of purchasing the rights in data. First, the amount of private
research and development funds expended by the original developer
will have a significant impact on the cost of the data rights.
The more the contractor spends on R&D, the more the Government
can expect to pay for the acquisition of data rights. If the
item has commercial applicability, the extent to which this
applicability exists will have a direct bearing on the cost of
the data rights. A company will be less willing to sell the
data rights if that item can provide substantial commercial
revenues. Finally, the program manager must consider the impact
of obtaining the data rights relative to the size of the company.
Conceivably, this item could be the company's only product.
To purchase the data rights would, in essence, be to purchase
the company.
To avoid or minimize the effects of the data rights
issue, early planning is essential. The use of a data rights
clause, the predetermination of data rights clause and the
alternatives to the predetermination clause have been discussed
in Chapter III. Early planning will facilitate their appropriate
94
use. Also, early planning will allow the Government to exercise
its monopsonistic leverage. Competition in the early acquisi-
tion phases may effectively reduce or eliminate the data rights
issue. Contractors may be more interested in contract award
and therefore make concessions that would otherwise not be made
in the sole source environment. Finally, the insertion of a
"non-use" provision in the contract with the original developer
will protect his interests while allowing for the transfer of
the data rights to the second source. The "non-use" provision
prohibits the second source in using the limited data for any
purpose other than for the production of Government supplies.
If, for a mature program, the issue of data rights
surface, how can its effects best be minimized? The program
manager should first ensure that all data rights are identified
in the data package. The contractor is then contacted to
ensure the validity of the data rights. If the data rights
are claimed to be valid, the contractor should be required to
provide written substantiation for this claim. Given that the
substantiation is adequate, the program manager should then
attempt to negotiate for the option to purchase the data rights.
4 . Initial Investment Costs
The issue of initial investment costs is generic to
the TDP second sourcing methodology. Costs will be incurred for
the TDP validation process, the purchase of unlimited rights
in limited rights data, the purchase of the TDP itself, and
the set-up costs for the second source. Therefore, the program
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manager should plan for any additional funding to allow for
these costs.
Several factors should be considered to reduce these
costs. First, remember that there are several methods of TDP
validation. As these methods become more comprehensive in
scope, the cost associated with these methods increase. There-
fore, the validation method should be chosen carefully to ensure
unnecessary costs are not incurred. The cost of data rights
can be reduced by early planning and the rigorous pursuit of the
justification of these rights. As one reduces the scope and
number of these data rights, the costs associated with purchase
should decrease.
Competition is facilitated by the use of a properly
validated TDP. Qualified contractors can compete on the basis
of price. This streamlines the procurement process and allows
for a reduction in administrative and production leadtime.
5 . Maintenance Considerations
The maintenance philosophy is generic to all second
sourcing methodologies. If the maintenance philosophy is
organic in nature, then the reprocurement of identical items
is appropriate. The costs associated with spares, repair
parts, special test equipment, and personnel training, will
increase due to the increase in the number of repairable items.
If different configurations were procured and the maintenance
philosophy was still organic, then the above costs would have
to increase to support a unique item. However, if there was
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no maintenance planned (as may be the case for items that are
extremely reliable or consumable in nature) the importance of.
having an identical item is minimized or negated altogether.
To ensure that the proper second sourcing methodology
is pursued, it is essential for the program manager to develop
the maintenance philosophy early in the acquisition process.
For example, if the maintenance is to be performed by the
contractor or no maintenance is planned, then why bother
securing the options to purchase data rights or the purchase
of the TDP and its validation? This is clearly an unnecessary
expense.
C . SUMMARY
This chapter has presented several key issues generic to
the TDP second sourcing methodology, including; (1) technology
transfer, (2) technical data package validation, (3) techni-
cal data rights, (4) initial investment costs, and (5) main-
tenance considerations. The program manager should consider




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this research effort was to study the pri-
mary attributes or characteristics of the Technical Data
Package second sourcing methodology and how this method could




The program manager must recognize when the Technical
Data Package second sourcing methodology is particularly
inappropriate for use .
The models presented in Chapter III and the analysis pre-
sented in Chapter V made it clear that there are circumstances
where the TDP second sourcing methodology is particularly
inappropriate. For instance, if the maintenance philosophy
was not organic, then it may not be necessary to purchase the
TDP. The models in Chapter III stated that if the item to be
considered for second sourcing was consumable in nature or
extremely reliable, then it would be appropriate to use other
second sourcing methodologies, particularly, Form, Fit, and
Function. Also, if there is a problem obtaining the data
rights at reasonable cost, the TDP second sourcing methodology
may not be appropriate.
2 When using the Technical Data Package as a vehicle
for the transfer of technology to a production source, early
planning is essential .
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Issues such as TDP validation, rights in technical data,
competition, and review of lessons learned should be resolved
as early as possible to ensure the second sourcing effort
will not be unnecessarily delayed. The earlier these issues




There is no significant guidance for the application
of the TDP second sourcing methodology .
The models described in Chapter III present various
attributes or decision variables that aid the program
manager in the selection of the proper second sourcing
methodology. However, these models do not sufficiently
examine the key issues that are generic to the TDP second
sourcing methodology. This could give the program manager a
false sense of security when applying the TDP second sourcing
methodology.
4 The Second Sourcing Method Selection Model and the
Form, Fit, and Function/Detailed Design Disclosure Acquisi-
tion Decision Model both present pertinent and relevant decision
variables or attributes to use in second sourcing strategy
decisions.
As discussed in Chapter III, both models provide the pro-
gram manager with key decision variables or attributes that
not only allow him to determine if his program is conducive
to competition; but, also, which second sourcing methodology
might be best for him to use. Factors such as procurement
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quantity, duration of the program, and market research indi-
cate if a program is conducive to competition. Other factors
such as maintenance level philosophy, up front funding, and
rights in technical data indicate whether a program is con-




Program offices are aware of those factors that make
a program conducive for competition and the TDP second sourcing
methodology .
In each program analyzed in Chapter IV, factors such as
maintenance level, procurement quality, program duration,
and cost growth were all presented as reasons for the use of
competition and the TDP second sourcing strategy.
6 The goals for competing both programs analyzed in this
study have apparently been met using the TDP second sourcing
methodology .
Each program office expressed a goal of cost control/
reduction, quality and reliability improvement, and industrial
base improvement. Except for the dispute on the cost effec-
tiveness of the AIM-7F SPARROW missile guidance and control
assembly, these goals have been achieved.
7 The Second Sourcing Method Selection Model fails to
distinguish between those factors that are relevant for the
competition and those that are relevant for second sourcing .
Duration of production and quantity produced are competi-
tion decision variables and should not be confused with second
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sourcing decision variables such as item complexity or
degree of private R&D. The SSMSM Model leads the user to
believe that all of these variables should be considered to
determine which second sourcing methodology is most appropriate
when, in fact, some of these variables have a direct bearing
on whether or not production competition is desirable at all,





The F/D Acquisition Decision Model should be employed
under actual program conditions .
3 3The F /D Acquisition Decision Model is a very comprehen-
sive model that allows the program manager to examine his pro-
gram for competition and to determine which acquisition approach
and strategy is best suited for the program. Future program
managers should acquire this model from the Naval Avionics
Center and use it in upcoming major weapon system acquisitions.
3 3
2 The F /D Acquisition Decision Model should be
expanded to include post-production programs .
3 3The F /D Acquisition Decision Model could be very valua-
ble if its scope was extended to include more mature programs.
The Naval Avionics Center should investigate ways to accomplish
this expansion.
3 The program manager should perform a comprehensive
TDP validation prior to its use as a second sourcing methodology
The lack of a comprehensive TDP validation increases the
risk of technology transfer. The program manager should use
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Government or contractor resources to perform this validation
process as a way to reduce this risk.
4 . The Second Sourcing Method Selection Model should be
amended to distinguish between competition and second sourcing
methodology decision variables .
The SSMSM Model may confuse the user between competition
and second sourcing decision variables. In that this model
presents relevant variables to use in the competition and
second sourcing decision process, the original authors should
investigate ways to make this distinction.
C. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1 . What are the primary attributes or characteristics
of the Technical Data Package (TDP) second sourcing methodology
and how might this be successfully employed ?
One attribute or characteristic of the TDP second sourcing
methodology is that this method will result in a "Chinese copy"
(or identical) item. This will usually prevent an increase of
logistic support costs for such things as unique spares or
repair parts, additional training, or new test equipment or
software that would otherwise be caused if the item reprocured
was not identical to the original.
The use of the TDP second sourcing methodology is greatly
dependent on the level of maintenance philosophy. If the main-
tenance philosophy is organic, then the procurement of an
identical item will control logistics costs. If a different
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configuration of the item is procured, then logistics support
costs will increase in order to maintain that item.
Reprocurement will be easier once a validated TDP is
established. Also, the second source should not have to use
additional research and development effort to use the TDP.
This should reduce the cost of reprocurement since there will
be no charge for this cost element. Finally, without this
additional effort, the reprocurement should be quicker than
that of the original procurement.
The Government is responsible for the quality of the TDP
and is liable for any deficiencies contained therein. Conse-
quently, the issue of technology transfer is an important
consideration as well as TDP validation and data rights.
The transfer of technology is accomplished solely through
a TDP and there is no contractor-to-contractor interface.
Once again, the importance of TDP validation and data rights
is presented. The program manager should be aware of these
issues prior to the use of the TDP second sourcing methodology.
The TDP second sourcing methodology is best employed by
planning early for its use, proper validation efforts, elimina-
tion or reduction of limited rights in data, and insuring proper
up front funding for the validation and purchase of the TDP.
2 . What is the Technical Data Package concept ?
This concept is a method by which the Government is respon-
sible for the technology transfer from one producer to another.
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This is done by the use of the TDP. Also, there is no
contractor-to-contractor interface for this technology transfer
3
.
What have been the significant issues or problems
involved with the TDP second sourcing methodology ?
Technology transfer, TDP validation, data rights, initial
investment costs, ease of reprocurement , and maintenance
philosophy, are each significant issues that are attendant to
the use of the TDP second sourcing methodology. Each of these
issues must be examined in detail to ensure that the TDP
second sourcing methodology is done on a timely and cost
effective manner.
4 How does Technical Data Package relate to other
second sourcing methodologies ?
The TDP methodology is based on design specifications
3
whereas the F methodology is based on performance specifica-
tions. Both methods preclude the use of contractor-to-
contractor interface. The technical data package transfers
the technology to produce an identical item (at least to the
3level consistent with the maintenance philosophy) . The F
requires only performance parameters be met regardless of the
technology used to obtain them. The leader-follower, directed
licensing, and contractor teaming methodologies require varying
degrees of conctractor interfact to allow for a smooth flow
of technology transfer. Design specifications are the basis
for these methods in that identical items are being fabricated
for reprocurement by the second source.
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D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
One area for research should be the analysis of the NAC
3 3
F /D Acquisition Decision Model as applied to an actual pro-
gram. Also, the incorporation of the key issues presented
in Chapter V should be included in this model to give the
program manager a better appreciation of these significant
factors
.
Another area for further research may be on the impact
of computer-aided design/computer-aided manufacture (CAD/CAM)
as it relates to the major weapon system acquisition phases
of Concept Exploration, Demonstration and Validation, and Full
Scale Development. Issues such as contract cost and type and












- One Time Build of Only a Few Units
- Unique State of the Art Process
Required and/or Proprietary Data
are Essential to Systems Opera-
tion, and it has been determined
that it is not cost effective to
delete from data package or to
procure rights to data
- Urgent and Unforseen Requirements
do not Allow Sufficient Time for
Competition
- The Design is not Stable
- Large quantity, Multi-Year
Procurements are Planned
- High Unit Costs and Inventory Value
- Validation Cost would be Offset by
Savings Resulting from Competition
- Data Rights must/should be Owned
by Government
- Broad Industrial Base is Available
and/or Desired for Mobilization
- Contractor Failure Would Jeopardize
Mission Requirements
- Long Term Support Needed (Spares)
- Large Production Capacities Required


















In a few select cases a product may have been developed
which is " State-of-Art. " It may be unwise to attempt
competition and hence validation may not be essential.
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A high program risk may occur and total program costs may
be higher in the long run. A close watch must be main-
tained on this type of product to determine when industry
acquires the design/process and establishes a wide base.
Once this occurs, the data package should be validated and
the product should then go competitive.
2. A low unit cost is not sufficient justification for sole
source; other factors must be considered (i.e., quantities,
industrial base, etc.).
3. If the failure of the sole source through natural catas-
trophy, business failure, labor difficulties, or inability
to perform and deliver required systems hardware would
jeopardize fleet mission requirements, competitive, or
multiple acquisition sources with a properly validated
data package should be planned and budgeted for.
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APPENDIX B
COMPARISON OF COMPETITIVE ACQUISITION DATA VALIDATION METHODS
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SECOND SQURCING METHOD SELECTION MODEL



























Low quantities make second sourcing diffi-
cult, especially for technical data package
Qualifying a second source takes time.
Licensing and leader- follower are
particularly unsuitable.
When steep learning is involved, any split
of production quantities will tend to
increase costs.
The more complex the system, the more diffi-
cult it is to second source. Contractor
teaming is especially effective in bringing
complementary technologies together.
Similar to technical complexity.
If there are significant alternative uses
for the system, original producer will
probably create barriers to second sourcing
Second sourcing success limited if criti-
cal elements are proprietary.
Provides original producer strong competi-
tive advantage if costs are very high.
Equal weighting for all alternatives.
The more capacity the original producer
has, the less likely second sourcing can
be effective.
If second sourcing introduces variations
in field maintenance, its viability
decreases
.
The longer the lead time, the smaller the
advantages of second sourcing.
Ill
Variable Effect
Degree of If many subcontractors are involved, the
Subcontracting advantages of second sourcing are
diluted.
Contractual The more complex the contractual relation-
Complexity ship with the original producer, the more
barriers there are to second sourcing.
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Fit- Data Directed Leader- Contractor
Function Package Licensing Follower
+ + + + +
+ + +
— —
+ + + + +
+ + + +
X X
_ _ _
+ + + + +
X + + *
+ - + + +
+ + + + +
X + + *
+ + + + +
+ + +
+ + + + +
X X _
+ + + +
Key:
+ = Strong applicability
- = Weak applicability
* = Particularly well suited
= Neutral applicability















































+ = Strong applicability
- = Weak applicability
= Neutral applicability
x = Particularly inappropriate
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Fit- Data Directed Leader- Contractor
Function Package Licensing Follower Team
+ + + + +
+ +
X ""
+ + + + +
+
X X X "
+ + + + +
X + + *
+ - + + +
+ + + + +
X + + *
+ + + + +
+ . + +
+ + + +
X X
+ + + +
Key:
+ = Strong applicability
- = Weak applicability
* = Particularly well suited
= Neutral applicability




Fit- Data Directed Leader- Contractor
*
Function Package Licensing Follower Team
Tooling Costs
High - - - - X




Low + + + + +
Contractor Capacity
Excess - - - - -
Deficient + + + + +
Maintenance Requirement
Significant X
Minimal + + + + +
Production Lead Time
Long - - - - -
Short + + + + +
Degree of
Subcontracting
Heavy - - - -
Light + + + + +
Contractor Complexity
Complex - - - - -
Simple + + + + +
Key:
+ = Strong applicability
- = Weak applicability
= Neutral applicability
x = Particularly inappropriate
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APPENDIX D
F /D ACQUISITION DECISION MODEL
3 3Comparative Summary of the F and D Acquisition Approaches
F Acquisition Approach
Form, Fit, and Function only
ensures interchangeability
at the WRA level. Internal
configurations may vary,
are functionally but not
logistically interchangeable.
Development of multiple
suppliers 1 equipment in
parallel is required.
If compliance with the
system/WRA specification can
be demonstrated, the contrac-
tor is authorized to make
internal design changes.
Contractor assumes respon-
sibility for adequacy of
design and production data.
Government buys maintenance
data only when organic
maintenance is planned.
The equipment specification





D ensures interchangeability at
the WRA, SRA, and piece part levels.
Internal configurations are identi-
WRAs cal. WRAs and SRAs are functionally
and logistically interchangeable.
Design competition between competing
FSD contractors is encouraged but
single source development of equip-
ment is permissible.
The contractor must obtain Navy
approval for all design changes.
Government retains configuration
control during full production.
Government assumes responsibility
for adequacy of design and
production data.
Government buys the Technical Data
Package (TDP) and the data rights.











INVESTMENT? NO SEE SECTION 7.1.
a









































NO (SEE SECTION 7 . l.f )
TO F 3 /D 3 DECISION
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- STAGE 3




(USE A TECHNOLOGY OR
; PRODUCTION TECHNIQUE |
ilHAT IS VERY DIFFICULT



















HOW OF THE DEVELOPER;
BE REQUIRED TO
TRANSFER THE





































FOLLOWER SPEC MODEL VALIDATED INDUSTRY








6.3.1 INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR
PRODUCTION COMPETITION.
6.3.2 BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO OBTAIN MORE THAN ONE
QUALIFIED DESIGN/PRODUCER.
6.3.3 PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFI-
CATION FOR EACH WRA IN THE SYSTEM.
6.3.4 RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE DATA/DATA RIGHTS IN ALL FSD
AND PRODUCTION RFP ' S
.




PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
6.3.7 RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS,
6.3.8 PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
6.3.9 INCLUDE CLAUSE IN ALL CONTRACTS GUARANTEEING LIFETIME
SUPPORTABILITY/AVAILABILITY
.
6.3.10 DEVELOP FALL-BACK STRATEGIES IN THE EVENT F 3 PROGRAM
REVERTS TO ONE CONTRACTOR.
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APPLICATION GUIDELINES
D 3 CONTRACTOR TEAMING
6.4.1 INFORM £LL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR
PRODUCTION COMPETITION.
6.4.2 BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO DEVELOP AND FACILITIZE TV/O
OR MORE PRODUCERS.
6.4.3 PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICA-
TION TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
6.4.4 STRUCTURE THE FSD RFP AND ESTABLISH SOURCE SELECTION
CRITERIA TO GUARANTEE THAT BOTH CONTRACTORS OF THE
SELECTED TEAM WILL EVENTUALLY BE CAPABLE OF INDEPEN-
DENT PRODUCTION.
6.4.5 SEEK LEGAL COUNSEL BEFORE PLACING FSD CONTRACTS TO
DETERMINE IF ANTITRUST PROBLEMS MIGHT EXIST.
6.4.6 PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS
6.4.7 RETAIN THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE
AND DATA RIGHTS AND INCLUDE THIS OPTION (NOT-TO-EXCEED)
IN SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA.
6.4.
8
PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
6.4.9 RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
6.4.10 PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
6.4.11 DO NOT ALLOW EITHER CONTRACTOR TO ENTER THE PRODUCTION
PHASE UNTIL BOTH SOURCES ARE QUALIFIED (TECHEVAL AND
OPEVAL)
.
6.4.12 IMPLEMENT PARALLEL PILOT PRODUCTION BEFORE PLACING
COMPETITIVE PRODUCTION CONTRACTS.
6.4.13 IMPOSE STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON THE PRODUCT
BASELINE DURING THE FSD AND PRODUCTION PHASES.




D 3 DIRECTED LICENSING
6.5.1 INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR
PRODUCTION COMPETITION.
6.5.2 BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT COMPETITION.
6.5.3 PERFORM A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFI-
CATION TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
6.5.4 SEEK LEGAL COUNSEL BEFORE PLACING FSD CONTRACT TO FULLY
UNDERSTAND LEGAL CLAIMS OF DEVELOPER.
6.5.5 DEVELOP CRITERIA FOR THE MANDATING OF DIRECTED LICENSING
6.5.6 PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE
PARTS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PRACTICABLE.
6.5.7 RETAIN THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE
AND DATA RIGHTS (NOT-TO-EXCEED) AND INCLUDE THIS OPTION
IN SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA.
6.5.8 PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO PERFORM PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
6.5.9 RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
6.5.10 PROCURE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
6.5.11 IMPOSE STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON THE PRODUCT
BASELINE DURING THE PRODUCTION PHASE.





6.6.1 INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR
PRODUCTION COMPETITION.
6.6.2 BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO MOTIVATE LEADER AND DEVELOP
FOLLOWER.
6.6.3 PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICA-
TION TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
6.6.4 DEVELOP CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF THE FOLLOWER
SOURCE AS PART OF FSD CONTRACT.
6.6.5 DEVELOP CONTRACT INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE THE LEADER TO
ASSIST IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTION
CAPABILITY TO THE FOLLOWER.
6.6.6 PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS
6.6.7 RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE
AND DATA RIGHTS (NOT-TO-EXCEED) AND INCLUDE IN SOURCE
SELECTION CRITERIA.
6.6.8 PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
6.6.9 RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
6.6.10 PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
6.6.11 IMPOSE STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON THE PRODUCT
BASELINE DURING THE PRODUCTION PHASE.





D PERFORMANCE SPEC/MODEL/AVAILABLE DATA
6.7.1 INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR
PRODUCTION COMPETITION.
6.7.2 BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
6.7.3 PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFI-
CATION TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
6.7.4 DEVELOP SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE SELEC-
TION OF A COMPETITIVE SOURCE THAT HAS SUFFICIENT CAPA-
BILITY TO PERFORM REVERSE ENGINEERING AND EFFICIENT
MANUFACTURING.
6.7.5 PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS
6.7.6 PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE AND DATA RIGHTS IN
FSD CONTRACT.
6.7.7 PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
6.7.8 RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
6.7.9 PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
6.7.10 IMPOSE STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON TECHNICAL DATA
PACKAGE AND THE PRODUCT BASELINE DURING PRODUCTION PHASE
6.7.11 PERFORM A DESK-TOP AUDIT OF THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE
BEFORE USING IT AS A BASIS FOR CONTRACTURAL REQUIRE-
MENTS LEVIED ON COMPETITIVE SOURCE.





D INDEPENDENTLY VALIDATED DATA PACKAGE
6.8.1 INFORM ALL POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR
PRODUCTION COMPETITION.
6.8.2 BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
6.8.3 PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICA-
TION TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
6.8.4 PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS
6.8.5 PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE AND DATA RIGHTS AND
INCLUDE IN SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA.
6.8.6 PURCHASE ANY SPECIAL TOOLING AND TEST EQUIPMENT NEEDED
TO VALIDATE THE DATA PACKAGE AND TO ESTABLISH THE
PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AT THE COMPETITIVE SOURCE.
INCLUDE IN SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA.
6.8.7 PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE CONCEPT.
6.8.8 RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
6.8.9 PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
6.8.10 CONTRACT WITH THE DEVELOPING SOURCE FOR TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE DURING DATA PACKAGE VALIDATION TO RESOLVE
DISCREPANCIES IN THE DATA AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES.
6.8.11 IMPOSE STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON TECHNICAL DATA
PACKAGE
.
6.8.12 VALIDATE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE BEFORE USING IT TO
ESTABLISH A COMPETITIVE SOURCE.





D JOINT GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY VALIDATED DATA PACKAGE
6.9.1 INFORM POTENTIAL CONTRACTORS OF PLANS FOR
PRODUCTION COMPETITION.
6.9.2 BUDGET SUFFICIENT FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
6.9.3 PREPARE A COMPLETE AND ACCURATE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICA-
TION TO THE SYSTEM LEVEL.
6.9.4 PROHIBIT THE USE OF PROPRIETARY AND/OR SOLE SOURCE PARTS.
6.9.5 PURCHASE THE TECHNICAL DATA PACKAGE AND DATA RIGHTS AND
INCLUDE IN SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA.
6.9.6 PURCHASE ANY SPECIAL TOOLING AND TEST EQUIPMENT NEEDED
TO VALIDATE THE DATA PACKAGE AND TO ESTABLISH THE
PRODUCTION CAPABILITY AT THE COMPETITIVE SOURCE.
INCLUDE IN SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA.
6.9.7 PURCHASE MAINTENANCE ITEMS NEEDED TO SUPPORT PLANNED
MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY.
6.9.8 RETAIN OPTION TO PURCHASE ALL OTHER MAINTENANCE ITEMS.
6.9.9 PURCHASE DATA FOR A PARTS TRACEABILITY PROGRAM.
6.9.10 CONTRACT WITH THE DEVELOPING SOURCE FOR TECHNICAL ASSIS-
TANCE DURING DATA PACKAGE VALIDATION TO RESOLVE DISCREPAN-
CIES IN THE DATA AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES.
6.9.11 IMPOSE STRICT CONFIGURATION CONTROL ON TECHNICAL DATA
PACKAGE
.
6.9.12 DEVELOP AN INTEGRATED PLAN FOR THE JOINT VALIDATION
EFFORT THAT DESCRIBES THE TASKS TO BE PERFORMED AND THE
SCHEDULE/PHASING OF THE TASKS FOR THE GOVERNMENT, THE
DEVELOPER AND THE COMPETITIVE SOURCE.
6.9.13 ESTABLISH SOURCE SELECTION CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE SELEC-
TION OF A COMPETITIVE SOURCE THAT HAS SUFFICIENT ENGINEER-
ING AND MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY TO VALIDATE THE DATA
PACKAGE AS DEFINED IN THE PLAN.
6.9.14 VALIDATE THE DATA PACKAGE BEFORE ESTABLISHING PRODUCTION
COMPETITION.
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